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I. INTRODUCTION

The conventional view of law is state-centered. 1 Law is
analyzed as the product of state processes as if it reflects only the
1.
See JOHN AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (1911); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (2d ed. 1994); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW & STATE (Anders
Weddberg trans., 1961) (discussing the pure theory of law in which law and the
state are the same entities). There is now, however, a growing body of global law,
developing largely outside the state. See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE (1997). On the concept of global law in general, see ANTHONY
GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCE OF MODERNITY (1990); Jost Delbrfick, Globalization of
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political and economic forces and conflicts of the jurisdiction in
which it is produced. 2 Underlying the evolution of state-centered
domestic law, especially public law, 3 is an implicit theory of the
role of the state. For most of the nineteenth century, for example,
it was assumed, in accord with John Locke, that the state would
play a role "limited to the presentation of the rights of its
members against infringement by others . . . . It is this and
nothing more; a state exceeds its legitimate function if it
endeavors to go beyond these limits." 4 The New Deal ushered in
another and very different conception of the state, especially at

the federal level. It supported a strong national state, one that

to ensure that
was expected to intervene in a variety of markets
s
they function in a fair and effective manner.

Law, Politics, and Markets-Implicationsfor DomesticLaw-A EuropeanPerspective,
1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9 (1993) [hereinafter Delbrfick, Globalization of Law,
Politics and Markets]; Niklas Luhmann, The World Society as a Social System, 8
INT'L J. GEN. SYS. 131-38 (discussing the global communication necessary with a
self-referential view of social systems).
Lex Mercatoriais one of the primary examples of global law. For a history of
lex mercatoria, see Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions flex mercatoria), in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (LEX
MERCATORIA), Part III, folio 3 (W. S. Surrey & D. Wallace, Jr. eds., 1983); J. H.
Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
295-322 (1979); see also YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE
(1996) (analyzing commercial arbitrators).
Even if law were wholly state-centered, domestic law is not an exact
2.
mirror of society; society has too many faces for a single mirror. To the extent law
does reflect various economic and political forces in a jurisdiction, law reflects
some, but not necessarily all of the multiple perspectives involved, and it reflects
them to varying degrees.
Similarly, references to the state are not meant to imply that it is a unified
whole or an individual actor. The author uses the term to refer to the various
state institutions, decision-making processes, and policy outcomes and their
effects, recognizing that these processes and outcomes are not necessarily
internally consistent.
The author uses the term public law to refer primarily to areas of the
3.
law that directly involve the state or concepts of the state. Thus, public law
includes constitutional and administrative law, but this term is, of course, a
short-hand way of referring to these areas of law. Aspects of public and private
law often merge with one another, and the discussion in this article does not

mean to imply any rigid distinctions behveen the two.

For examples of how

private law can merge or take on public law aspects, see Symposium, The New
Private Law, 73 DEN. U. L. REv. 993-1279 (1996).
See C. HARROW & R. RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 9-10 (1984).
4.
See generallyFRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); NOzICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 8-24
5.
(1992).
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Today, the processes of twentieth century globalization have
de-centered the state. 6 Capital moves freely around the world
with relatively little direction from states. 7 Internet technologies
create global networks without regard to national or internal
boundaries. 8 Cultural influences and images flow across state
lines without regard to borders. 9 More importantly, many of the
problems and actors with which states now deal are not, or not
solely, within a state's own territorial boundaries. The state itself
is now subject to and affected by the same globalizing forces that
are transforming business and other aspects of daily life. The

empirical realities of globalization and their effects on the state
raise important interpretive questions concerning how we should
now think about and assess the law developed by a de-centered
state, one that is, in many ways, globalized by the very processes

that now affect its constituents.
The primary purpose of this Article is to consider the
relationship of globalization to domestic law, a topic that, for the

6.
See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL 28 (1996) ("Sovereignty and
territory... remain key features of the international system. But they have been
reconstituted and partly displaced onto other institutional arenas outside the
state and outside the framework of nationalized territory."); SUSAN STRANGE, THE
RETREAT OF THE STATE-THE DIFFUSION OF POWER INTHE WORLD ECONOMY 46 (1996)
("[T~he progressive integration of the world economy.., has shifted the balance of
power away from states and toward world markets.") [hereinafter STRANGE, THE
RETREAT OF THE STATE]; Philip G. Cerny, What Next for the State?, in GLOBALIZATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 123 (Eleonore Kofinan & Gillian Youngs eds., 1996)
("I]ncreasing transnational interpenetration has the potential to transform the
international system from a true states system into one in which this external
bulwark is eroded and eventually undermined.") [hereinafter Cerny, What Next for
the State?]; see also Philip G. Cerny, Plurilateralism:StructuralDifferentiation and
FunctionalConflict in the Post-Cold War World Order,22 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD.
27-51 (1993).
7.
See D.M. Andrews, Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a
Structural Theory of InternationalMonetary Relations, 38 INTL STUD. Q. 193 (1994).
For an analysis of capital mobility and its relationship to labor mobility, see
SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL (1988).
This is not necessarily to argue that the state could not intervene in some
manner, if it chose to. For a recent review essay discussing capital mobility, the
power of central banks to regulate capital flows, and the extent to which
international institutions can affect domestic policies, see David M. Andrews &
Thomas D. Willett, FinancialInterdependenceand the State: InternationalMonetary
Relations at Century's End, 51 INT'L ORG. 479 (1997); see also ERIC HELLEINER,
STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE
1990's (1991).
8.
See SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL, supra note 6, at 21-22; Symposium, Joel
P. Trachtman, Cyberspace and Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 561
(1998).
9.
See generally Aijun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global
CulturalEconomy, in GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY
295, 295-308 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990).
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most part, has been neglected by the legal literature to date. 10 In
so doing, this Article shall develop the concept of the globalizing
state, a theory of the state based on states' new roles in
furthering global competitiveness, as well as the transformative
effects of these new roles on the state itself." This Article refers
to globalization as an interpretive approach to issues no longer
classifiable-or even understandable-in terms of classic
dichotomies of domestic and global, public and private, or federal
and state. The integration of local and national economies with
the global economy, the changing role of the state, the creation of
new mixtures of public and private power, and the increasing
importance of denationalized sources of law, have significantly
changed the meaning of such concepts as "domestic," "private," or
"local." The "local" must now be understood as one modality in a
complex global process, rather than a unified place or
jurisdiction.
These changes transform conventional debates concerning
the market and government's role in the market. What once may
have been private now has important public and global
dimensions. What once may have been public now employs the
private sector in new ways. Several sets of questions thus arise
in the context of globalization that are of particular importance to
our ability to assess and understand domestic law. First, what
theory of the state should guide our analysis of domestic law? Do
the processes of globalization and the privatization and
deregulation they encourage signal a return to an earlier, more
Lockean version of the state or do they signal the need for a new
12
Is this role to be minimal,
role for the state to play?

facilitative, 13 one of resistance 14 or one which embodies a

10.

For an analysis of the relationship of globalization to international law,

see Jost Delbrick, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing With Global Problems,

4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277 (1997) [hereinafter The Role of the United
Nations]. See also Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997). For an analysis of deregulation in the United States as
an aspect of the processes of globalization, see AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A
GLOBAL ERA, supranote 5.

11.
As we shall see, the globalized state is not a unified entity. It is
disaggregated in aspects of its policy-making processes. See, e.g., Anne-Marie
Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997); A
Typology ofTransiudicialCommunication, 29 RICHMOND L. REv. 99 (1994). It is also
increasingly affected by the diverse, global aspirations of its globally-oriented
constituents. Indeed, the state itself is subject to the forces of globalization and
has been transformed by them. See infra text accompanying notes 192-98.
See, e.g., NOZICK, supranote 4.
12.
13.
See infra notes 161-91 (discussing the efficient state).
14.
See also 'Fast Track' is Derailed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at A26
(discussing how domestic political resistance can block attempts to facilitate
globalization processes and, in particular, processes to encourage free trade). See
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collective approach to determining the public interest, globally
conceptualized? 15 With regard to this first set of questions, my
main argument will be that the state's reactions to globalization
are not mere changes in function, but transformations in the

nature of the state itself.

This transformation requires new

understandings of the public role of private markets and the need
for states to form new partnerships with private actors. This kind
of privatization could have detrimental effects on the norm of
democracy if conventional notions of public and private remain in
place.
Thus, this Article also considers the role of democracy in a global
economy. The democracy question is closely related to issues of the
state's role. Globalization greatly affects democratic decision-making
values and processes in a number of ways. Political and economic
decisions in various parts of the world increasingly have immediate
impact on citizens in nations apart or excluded from those decisionmaking processes.16 Moreover, the processes of deep integration of
various national economies into the global economy often take the
17
form of privatization, deregulation, or some form of harmonization.
The end result of many of these processes is to place traditionally
public decisions into the hands of the private sector, lessening the
public's direct involvement in these matters.'
Conversely, some
issues which have always been private may now have a much greater

generally Special Issue: Globalisationand The Politics of Resistance, 2 J. POL. ECON.
5-195 (1997).
15.
See infra notes 192-98.
16.
See EVAN LUARD, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POLITICS: THE CHANGED Focus OF
POLITICAL ACTION IN THE MODERN WORLD Vi (1990) ("The welfare of ordinary men and
women no longer depends primarily on the actions of their own governments. It
depends, far more, on actions and decisions reached, far beyond the frontiers of
their own state, by other governments, or by international bodies taling decisions
collectively.").
17.
See Alfred Aman, Administrative Law For A New Century, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 90 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997); see also STEPHAN
HAGGARD, DEVELOPING NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION (1995).
18.
This process of moving from the public to the private is one of degree.
Deregulation and privatization are not self-defining terms that encompass wholly
private processes. They can mean or imply a variety of mixtures of public and private
power. See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supranote 5, at 44-47; Paul
Starr, The Meaning ofPrivatization,6 YALE L. & POLY REV. 6 (1988). Yet, there has been
a steady trend throughout the 1980s in particular of greater resort to markets and
market approaches. See generally THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supranote 17.
In addition, as we shall see below, contracting out governmental services to the private
sector should not be viewed as fully privatizing the service in question. Yet, such
contracts do tend to lessen day-to-day political control and input into the process. See
infra notes 240-91.
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public impact than ever before due to processes of globalization. For
example, capital markets can significantly influence public policy. 19
In analyzing these issues of democracy in a global context,
this Article argues that traditional concepts of political
representation no longer may be enough to deal with citizens'
needs to have input into various decisions that affect their lives
on a daily basis. In some cases, the matters involved are global in
nature and beyond the political competency of any one

jurisdiction. In others, the transnational aspects of the interests
involved may be beyond the state's ability to aggregate the
interests of its constituents in making public policy. Still, in
other situations, market approaches and market solutions to
problems may seem more appropriate, presumably eliminating
more collectively determined approaches to these questions. As
we shall see, however, whether we are dealing with markets or the
governmental use of markets, it is important to ensure that such
basic public law values as transparency and participation remain
intact.
Thus, this Article does not argue that there is no role for
states to play; rather, on the domestic level, that role is and must
be changing. At the international level, the state's role also
remains important, if international solutions to global problems
are to develop.
Accordingly, this Article also considers the
relationship of the state to other states, and, implicitly at least,
the roles of competition and cooperation as forms of global
governance. For states to play a useful and effective role in
providing solutions to transnational problems, they must
cooperate with other states, be it informally or through the
development of multilateral treaties.
Such cooperation is
facilitated by the ability of a national government to speak
authoritatively on certain issues for the various local political
entities that make up the country. Thus, the relationship of
federal and state power takes on special importance in global
contexts.

19.
See, e.g., SUSAN STRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM (1986) (discussing the
effect of the rapid international movement of capital on political and social
relations). At the same time, states also try to encourage economic growth
through policies such as those used by the U.S. and the international community
to bail out Mexico from its economic crisis in 1994. See SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL,
supra note 6, at 22-23; see also RICHARD BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, Electronic
Money and the CasinoEconomy, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 360-73
(Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996) (tracing the role of global financial
gamblers in the monetary crisis); Michael Schuman, South Korea Agrees to IMF's
Bailout Terms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1997, at A14 (discussing IMFs terms attached

to the $55 billion bailout package). See generally Jeffry A.Frieden, CapitalPolitics:
Creditorsand the InternationalPoliticalEconomy, 8 J. PUB. POL. (1988) (discussing
the relationship between international capital markets and economic policies).
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This is especially true since pulling against cooperative
approaches to problems is another dominant characteristic of
globalization-increased competition.
Competition for jobs,
industry, and capital is more intense in a global economy, given
the greater number of locations available to investors and the
relative statelessness of transnational corporations. Competition
for economic prosperity has greatly increased among and within
states and these forces often encourage more decentralized and
individualized approaches to issues. All of these factors are likely
to affect the way domestic decision-makers conceptualize and
apply domestic law. At the same time, the manner in which
domestic decision-makers decide what once were domestic law
issues also will affect the ability of states to cooperate on the
global level.
To explore these themes of democracy and the role of the

state, and to highlight the importance of a global perspective on
domestic law, this Article will focus on two specific areas of
domestic law: those that employ some version of the
public/private distinction and those that involve issues of
federalism. An analysis of these domestic law issues will show
that there is now more at stake in decisions involving these
doctrines and distinctions than when only national issues
predominated in the resolution of such cases.
To carry out this analysis, Part II of this Article begins with
some definitional issues and then discusses how power has been
shifting steadily from states to markets. In so doing, it will begin
with the concept of the globalizing state2 0 by showing how the decentering of the state that results from globalizing forces affects
domestic law and politics. The concept of the global state that
emerges is one that emphasizes the state's interdependence with
other states and non-state actors, its perceived need to be globally
competitive, and the fact that it must deal with issues and actors
that no longer are centered within any single territory. The global
state is not a single, unified entity, but a collection of people and
entities with various networks around the world.2 1 This sense of
the state thus suggests that the state itself is subject to the same

20.
The author shall use the terms globalizing state and global state
interchangeably. By global or globalizing state the author does not mean one
world-wide state. Rather, the terms refer to a state that has and continues to
reconfigure and reconceptualize itself to adapt to the processes of globalization.
In other words, the term globalizing state is meant to capture an on-going,
dynamic set of processes.

21.
See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations
Theory and InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLy 717, 727-31
(1995) (discussing a liberal conception of international law); Slaughter, The Real
New World Order, supranote 11.
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globalizing forces as its constituents and that it too has been
22
transforming itself in very significant ways.
Part III will then show how this shift from states to markets
and the corresponding changes in law and politics coincide with a
political conception of global competition that now gives states
some very particular roles to play to maximize their
competitiveness. Indeed, the primary national and state political
discourses today emphasize competition-competition between
and among nation-states, between and among states and
localities within those nations, as well as entities that do business
in these jurisdictions and the individuals who live there. 2 3 This
emphasis on global competition, however, usually goes well

beyond a purely economic

conception

of competition

that

distinguishes, for example, competitive markets from monopolistic
ones. 2 4 It also goes beyond well-established notions of
individualism and competitive self-reliance that are a basic part of
our political culture. It often can involve a political conception of
the role of competition in a global economy that, at the extreme,
substitutes global economic competition between and among
nation-states for war.2 5
The primary state weapons in this
economic war are those of laissez-faire global capitalism: free
markets, low taxes, and minimal regulation. 2 6 Such an approach
to the global economy encourages a domestic politics that also
incorporates competition as an ideology, encourages new market
approaches at all governmental levels, and views global
competition as both a primary tool of governance at the global
level and an important motivating factor for market reform at the
27
local level.
With the concept of the globalizing state and the overall
context of globalization as our underlying basis for analysis, Parts
IV and V then apply this global perspective and theory of the state
to domestic law, in particular to recent cases involving the
public/private distinction and the doctrine of federalism. How we

22.

See Aman, Administrative Law For A New Century, supra note 17, at

90-9 1; PHILIP G. CERNY, THE CHANGING ARCHITECTURE OF POLITICS 204-33 (1990).

23.

See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM 3-25 (1996); see also

THE GROUP OF LISBON, LIMITS TO COMPETITION xi-xii (1995) (describing the new

emerging era of global competition).
24.
See THE GROUP OF LISBON, supranote 23, at xiii.
25.

See, e.g., WILLIAM S.

DIETRICH, IN THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN 6

(1991) ("As Americans have focused on the military cold war with the Soviets, the
United States has beeri losing badly the economic hot War with Japan. Industry
after critical industry in the United States has been devastated by the Japanese,
as surely as if waves of bombers had come over to destroy our factories."); see
also CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES (1988).
26.
DIETRICH, supra note 25.
27.
See generally AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supranote 5.
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conceptualize what is public or what is private, and, for
constitutional purposes, how we determine what is state and
what is federal, is crucial to the ability of our legal system to
create the legal space necessary to allow new forms of public
participation to occur. Parts IV and V thus consider the impact of
globalization on democracy and the important role courts and
lawmakers generally can play to ensure, to the extent possible,
that the norm of democracy is furthered, rather than undermined
by the processes of globalization.
Part IV examines the public/private distinction in various
contexts.
In particular, it examines the legal and market
implications of contracting-out basic governmental services and
functions. How courts and policymakers define "the public" and

"the private" in these contractual partnerships affects the reach of
the Constitution and administrative law, thereby directly affecting
democratic accountability and public participation in important
policy decisions. 28 With regard to the separation of public and
private powers, an important question this Article addresses is at
what point the invocation of the market becomes more
metaphorical than real. A global perspective on such issues
underscores the fact that our concepts of the private and the
public have now been fundamentally changed by globalization.
There are, of course, institutional limits to what courts can and
should do when it comes to modernizing doctrinal approaches to
ensure their applicability to current global conditions. Indeed,
courts seldom even recognize explicitly the global context in which
they are deciding cases involving new mixtures of public and
private or federal and state power.2 9 Nevertheless, how courts
decide issues defining the public and the private greatly affect what
roles the global state can play and what protections citizens can
anticipate when it comes to the more frequent use of various new
mixtures of public and private power. Ultimately, Congress itself
may have to legislate in new ways that further define the global
state and help create the kinds of multilateral governmental
approaches to issues that may be necessary. For example, there
may be a need for national minimal standards that private prison
providers must meet. The extent of Congress' power to legislate in
this way and to experiment legislatively in areas with significant
global impact becomes especially important when issues previously

28.
See, e.g., JACK BEERMAN, THE REACH OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES; Aman, Administrative Law ForA New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 17, at 171-95, 90-118; see generally Zillah

Eisenstein, Stop Stomping On The Rest of Us: Retrieving Publicness from the
Privatizationof the Globe, 4 IND. J,GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1996).
29.
For a recent example of such recognition in the context of federalism,
see Lopez v. U.S., 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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thought of as local, now also have important global dimensions as
well.
Part V thus examines recent judicial approaches to federalism
from a global perspective. Issues of federalism take on a different

character in a global context.

The processes of globalization

encourage decentralization and competition, not only among
industries and firms, but also among and between cities and states
as well. The extent to which individual states can cut their costs
and maximize their competitiveness greatly affects their citizens'
views of autonomy and states' rights, as well as states' ability to
compete more effectively in the global economy. Federalism thus
also can raise the specter of a "race to the bottom" among various
This is particularly true because transnational
states.3 0
corporations now have the ability to locate almost anywhere in the
world. As a result, individual states within the United States are in
competition not only with one another, but with states abroad as
well. At the same time, problems that transcend the boundaries of
any one state create the need for more cooperation among states at
the international level. The ability of Congress to seek national
solutions to problems can affect the ability of the 3nation to engage
in effective international negotiations and treaties. '
This Article concludes that when choices of interpretive
approaches to constitutional doctrines exist, those approaches that
preserve, increase, or further the flexibility of decision-makers'
responses to the global economy should be preferred. Not unlike
the New Deal era when the Court had to confront new issues
arising from society's political responses to a newly emerging
nationally integrated economy, the Court today decides issues
against a backdrop of an increasingly integrated global economy.
An analysis of the public/private distinction and recent federalism
decisions *ill show that it is important that courts resist
constitutional approaches that unnecessarily limit change or new
power-sharing approaches to both new and old issues. While it
may seem ironic, some of the deferential, constitutional interpretive
approaches forged by the Court during the New Deal era may, in
fact, be best suited for the political experimentation now necessary,
especially if various levels of government and non-state actors are
to adapt successfully to the realities of a global economy. This
position, however, is not an argument for a return to the New Deal
so far as substance is concerned. There is no going back to the
nineteenth century or to the state-centric future that courts and

See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,95
30.
MICH. L. REv. 570, 627-34 (1996).
See infra text accompanying notes 320-25.
31.
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law makers have envisioned for the greater part of this nation's
history.
II. FROM STATES TO MARKETS-GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY

Globalization refers to complex, dynamic legal and social
processes that take place within an integrated whole, without
regard to geographical boundaries.3 2 Globalization thus differs
from international activities that occur between and among
states, and it differs from multinational activities that occur in
more than one nation-state.3 3 The area of integration involved
might be the 'entire globe or it might be a region or portions of
regions around the world.
The major distinguishing
characteristic of global activities is that the areas of integration
are largely oblivious to state boundaries, and that the processes
of globalization usually occur without or with little direct agency
of the state.3 4 Due to the liberating effects of technology and the
32.
See Delbrfick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets, supranote 1,
at 9; see also PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT 1-8 (2d ed. 1992) (analyzing the process
of globalization resulting from the interactions between states and corporations);
WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT (1997); KENICHI
OHMAE, THE
BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE INTERLINKED ECONOMY (1990);
SASKIA SASSEN, CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY (1994); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL

CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (1991) [hereinafter SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY];
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The EarthAs Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspectiueon Domestic
Regulation, 102 YALE L.J. 2107 (1993); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction to
Symposium, The Globalization of Law, Politics and Markets, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1993); Saskia Sassen, Towards A Feminist Analytics of the Global
Economy, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 7 (1996).
33.
See RICHARD OBRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF
GEOGRAPHY 5 (1992) (A truly global service knows no internal boundaries, can be
offered throughout the globe, and pays scant attention to national aspects ....
The closer we get to a global, integral whole, the closer we get to the end of
geography."). This does not mean one world market for everything. OBrien
describes the emergence of separate networks around foreign exchange,

securities, debt, investment and financial services, and these netvorks constitute
distinct markets. Id. at 32. These ideas are discussed in Robert Latham,
Globalisation and DemocraticProvisionism: Re-reading Polany4 2 NEW POL. ECON.
53 (1997).
34.
Id.; see also STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 3-15
(exploring the phenomenon of the following authority of the state). The state, of
course, can and often does facilitate the process of globalization by, for example,
providing for property rights and other legal regimes that may encourage
economic development. Thus, this is not to argue that states have or can have no
role in the processes of globalization. Rather, it is to argue that their role is no
longer as central as it once was and, to the extent the state engages in activities
that deter globalization, they can often be avoided by multinational actors who
simply decide to move aspects of their operations elsewhere or establish parallel,
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flow of capital around the world, private decisions involving
production, finance, and investment increasingly occur without
direct, individual state involvement. 35 Transnational corporations
decide where it is most cost-effective to locate various activities in
the value chains connected with the production and marketing of
goods and services. They may locate research and development in
one country, component assembly in another, final assembly in
yet another country, and distribution networks in yet another.
They also decide how much to customize the globally conceived
product for local markets.3 6
build or expand
a
The investment necessary to
manufacturing or distribution facility flows easily across national
borders. The financing for this investment is also increasingly
created without regard to any single place and by a global
financial industry located in various interconnected global
cities. 37 Through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)38 and other multilateral agreements, 3 9 trade in goods is
also facilitated; a substantial portion of world trade today takes
place between and among divisions of the same company doing
40
business in various locations around the globe.
The end result of these new networks of investment, finance,
and production is that they help to create relatively integrated
markets for their products and they produce new, multiple sets of
relationships or economic networks that transcend the geography
of states. 41 The same is true if one focuses on global problems
such as the global environment. Since some forms of pollution
know no boundaries, these issues cannot be solved by one state
alone. 42 The politics involved in issues such as global warming,

if not competing, legal regimes that cater primarily to their interests.
text accompanying notes 345-48.
35.
36.

See infra

See STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supranote 6.
See DICKEN, supra note 32, at 47-59; see also ROBERT B. REICH, THE

WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST-CENTURY CAPITALISM (1st ed.

1991).

37.

See SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY, supranote 32.

38.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,

55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
39.
See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8,

1992,

Canada-Mexico-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
40.
See STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 48 (r[O]ver a
quarter of all worldwide trade is now intra-firm trade .... As much as 40 percent
of Mexico's trade with the U.S. in the early 1990's, for example, was done by the
affiiates of US firms."); see also MANUFACTURING MIRACLES: PATHS OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA (Gary Gereffi & Donald L.

Wyman eds., 1990).
41.
Id; see also DICKEN, supra note 32, at 3-5 (discussing the resulting
economic interactions).
42.
See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 5, at 134-
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ozone depletion, or the destruction of the rainforest cannot help
but involve political networks that also transcend states and state
4
institutions. 3
These factors, of course, do not mean that states are no
longer important or do not have influence upon aspects of global
business activities or problems. It does mean that the role states

play is substantially different than in the past: the global
economic opportunities and problems that result from these
financial, production, and investment networks are not centered
in states or within any one state; nor can problems involving, for
example, the environment or public health be solved by one state
alone.44 Any one state's jurisdiction to deal with these issues is
limited in such contexts. 45 As a result, new bodies of global and
international law are developing to address issues that are neither
wholly domestic nor wholly international. 4 6 The distribution of
problems outside any one state heightens the need for states to
share or delegate power and responsibility to other states and an
increasing number of non-state transnational actors, actors that
47
are more powerful than ever before.
This is especially true of transnational corporations. Their
power is not a traditional form of state power derived from control
over resources within a geographical territory. Rather, it is a kind
of structural political power derived from being an important
participant in economic decisions. 48 Transnational corporations
can indirectly wield economic power that has very substantial
political consequences for individual states and the municipalities
within those states. A decision to shift production from one part
of the world to another can drastically affect the economy of a
particular area.
Even the threat to do so can affect local
policymakers. 49 Transnational corporations do not dictate public

43.

For an example of the transnational politics involved in global warming

issues, see GARETH PORTER & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS, 74-78, 92-103 (1991). See generally RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE
DIPLOMACY-NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1991).

44.

For an analysis of the global impact of public health problems, see

Symposium, The Public's Health in The Global Era: Challenges, Responses, and
Responsibilities,5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 1, 1-190 (1997).

45.

See id.

46.

See TEUBNER, supra note 1; Delbr-ck, The Role of the United Nations,

supra note 10.
47.
See, e.g., STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 91-99
(providing examples of various non-state authorities such as the Mafia).
48.
Id. at 25.
See generally Jeffrey Hart, Three Approaches to the
Measurement of Power in International Relations, 30 INT'L ORG. 289-305 (Spring
1976).
49.
Id. at 46-54; see also DICKEN, supra note 32, at 16-46 (describing the
shifting trademap); Rob Norton, Our Screwed-Up Tax Code, FORTUNE, Sept. 6,
1993, at 34.
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policy to the states, but the potential impact of their decisions
facilitates the flow of power from states to markets, as do

technologies and the integration and interdependence of
increasingly global markets. As Susan Strange has noted, the
"shift away from states and towards markets is probably the
biggest change in the international political economy to take place
in the last half of the twentieth century."50 This shift of power is
reflected in the changing role of and impact upon domestic, statecentered law and politics.
A. The Limits of State-Centered Law
Globalization does not necessarily mean the end or the
diminution of law, especially if one takes into account the need for
and the creation of new forms of global law. 5 1 For example,
transnational corporations have a distinct need for dispute
resolution techniques that are not directly linked to any one
country, and elaborate and important arbitration procedures have
been developing to meet these needs. 5 2 Similarly, human rights
have been conceptualized in ways that transcend any one state's
view of these issues, and local courts have applied the rulings of
53
the European Court of Justice to dramatically change local law.
Indeed, in a global world, legal pluralism is increasing, as is the
capacity for and the actual growth of various forms of global
54
law.
State-centered law still needs to deal with problems that arise
wholly or primarily within its own territories.
Criminal law
issues, local property rights, zoning laws, and the like, are statecentered, though they are very much affected by the integrated
global economy in which they operate. This is particularly true of
social and economic regulation, be it health, safety, and the
environment, or electric and natural gas rate-making.5 5
The
failure to understand the links between seemingly local issues
and the global economy within which they arise, however, can
lead to a mismatch between the conceptualization of regulatory

50.
See STRANGE, THE RETREAT OP THE STATE, supra note 6, at 43.
51.
See, e.g., TEUBNER, supranote 1.
52.
See generallyDEZALAY & GARTH, supranote 1.
53.
For an analysis of how the European Court of Justice fundamentally
affects English constitutional and administrative law, see Yvonne Cripps, Some
Effects of European Law on English Administrative Law, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 213, 219 (1994).
54.
Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, in TEUBNER, supranote 1, at 3-31.
55.
For an analysis of deregulation involving these areas of regulation as
part of a larger set of global changes, see AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL
ERA, supranote 5, at 42-77.
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problems by state-centered politicians and policymakers, and
transnational actors, who must take a global perspective on how
they operate their businesses and what markets they seek to
reach. National and local goals and legal objectives may be at
odds with or irrelevant to the demands of a global market and the
global competition faced by certain industries.5 6 An individual
state's reaction to nationally perceived problems cannot create a
level playing field for all who do business within its borders, since
integrated global markets mean that a variety of other legal
regimes are involved in such a company's processes.
Cost
comparisons must be made among various jurisdictions and the
results of these comparisons often drive investment and
manufacturing decisions.
More fundamentally, the structural make-up of web-like
companies that transcend state, regional, and national
boundaries makes a territorially-centered, hierarchical law more
problematic
than
when businesses-even
multinational
businesses-were focused on a single locale. 5 7 State-centered
law, with its natural hierarchy of authority in the courts, coupled
with its conceptual ability to categorize certain issues and
problems in ways that create domestic law capable of consistent
and fair application, can be at odds with business operations
whose territories are unrelated to state borders, as well as the
pace of economic and technological change in many global
industries. Markets and the flexibility of market responses to
problems often seem a more appropriate response to the problems
faced by and opportunities presented to business entities that
operate globally. This more fluid sense of place arises not only
because transnational companies are capable of doing business
simultaneously in various states, but because of wholly national
entities that seek to export their products to various developing
worldwide markets. Since more potential and real marketplaces
are involved, more factors affecting economic conditions are in
play, necessitating quicker reactions and changes on the part of
even those companies whose facilities are located wholly within a
particular state, but which seek to sell their products on a global
basis-s
A number of regulatory reforms have accompanied the
structural changes in the industries doing business globally.
Privatization, deregulation, and the use of market-oriented regulatory
approaches and structures are increasingly common reforms
56.
See REICH, supra note 36; see also Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism,supra note 30, at 587-97.
57.
See DICKEN, supra note 32, at 189-227 (analyzing the network of
transnational corporations); see also REICH, supranote 36, at 113.
58.
See id.

1998]

THE GLOBALIZZIG STATE

throughout the West.5 9 Not unlike corporations, states also have
been reconceptualizing and reconfiguring themselves in light of the
structural changes occurring in the global economy. The end result
has been an increase in both market forms and regulatory
structures, as well as an increasing recognition of the cost of national
60
regulation and its impact on the growth of the global economy.
There are many reasons why this turn to the market has
occurred. In addition to the pace of change, the limits of a state's
regulatory jurisdiction, and the nature of transnational actors and
global markets, substantive changes in technology often have
rendered the primary economic rationale for state intervention in
some areas, such as communications, obsolete. 6 1 What once might
have justified regulation in radio and television technologies, for
example, given the limited range of frequencies available, does not
apply to cyberspace and the Internet, where competition and
multiple voices and points of view are possible. 62 Similarly, cable
television, satellite capabilities and other technological changes

have made deregulation of portions of the communications industry
entirely plausible, if not necessary. This is not to say that the new,
more market-oriented role of the state is permanent or that new
reasons for regulation will not emerge. The process of change from
regulation to deregulation focuses on regulatory rationales based on
market failures no longer applicable to some of today's
technologies; however, new regulatory rationales may emerge, such
as undue concentration of media power. 6 3 Nevertheless, the global
nature of technologies such as the Internet, coupled with an almost
infinite number of users, will undoubtedly necessitate different
forms as well as different rationales for any state involvement, if it
is to occur.
Quite apart from the fact that certain kinds of business
operations do not adhere to state boundaries as they once did,
other kinds of human concerns are clearly beyond the

59.

See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 5; Alfred

Aman, A Global Perspective On CurrentRegulatory Reform: Rejection, Relocation, or
Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (1995).
Id.; see also STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 81.
60.
But see STATES AGAINST MARKETS: THE LIMITS OF GLOBALIZATION (Robert Boyer &
Daniel Drache eds., 1996) (arguing that states can still assert their power

effectively).
61.
62.

See, e.g., FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 11 (1997).

See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344

(1997) ("[U]nlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized
regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a

"scarce" expressive commodity."). Id.
63.
Technology

See Victoria A. Ramundo, The Convergence of Telecommunications
and Providers: The

Evolving

Regulation,6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 35 (1996).

State Role

in

Telecommunications
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organization of our national economies and are not susceptible to
regulation by any one state.
Environmental problems, for
example, know no particular bounds, as most pollution travels
freely across state and national borders. 6 4 Problems such as acid
rain, greenhouse gases, ozone depletion, and the like, require
multiple parties to agree before law may provide any effective
solutions. 6 S In short, a state cannot exercise effective authority
alone when the problems it is trying to solve or the actors it
wishes to regulate are not centered within the state's borders. To
the extent that these issues are state-based, such a location
usually is only temporary and easily shifted. Thus, the decrease
in state-centered regulatory power is a result that flows primarily
from the nature of global problems, the global reach of the
technologies involved, and the relative mobility and freedom of the
66
transnational actors to which the law would apply.

This does not mean that states cannot continue to act as they
have in the past; however, while it may be possible to draft a law
that seeks, for example, to regulate the flow of capital into or out
of a country, it would be very difficult to enforce it. This is
particularly true given the use of the Internet in such capital
transactions. 6 7 Even where a national law can be passed that
applies to global industries, i.e., a domestic law that seeks to
punish foreign firms that manufacture their goods with child
labor, the protectionism such a law would provide local industry
will trigger its own international legal, economic, and political
difficulties. 68 The integration of markets, the economic appeal of
69
entry into new markets, as well as limitations created by GATT,
often militate in favor of minimal regulation, especially when it

64.

See Symposium, Above the Boundaries Ozone Depletion, Equity, and

Climate Change, 15 LAW & POL'Y 1, 1-74 (1993); see also ALEXANDRE CHARLES KISS
& DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991).
65.
See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 5, at 13436; see also LYNTON K. CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
EMERGENCE AND DIMENSIONS (2d ed. 1990).
66.
See generally SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL, supranote 6, at 98.

67.
See Sarah Jane Hughes, A Call for International Legal Standards For
Emerging Retail Electronic Payment Systems, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197 (1996).
See also Bill Maurer, Cyberspatial Sovereignties: Offshore Finance, Digital Cash,
and the Limits of Liberalism, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 493 (1998).
68.
See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link. Applying the International
Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L.

361, 403 (1995) (discussing problems of enforcing child labor standards through
the GAT).
69.
See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement
Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594,

1618 (the process/product distinction in the tuna/dolphin case).
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comes to the processes by which goods are made elsewhere in the
world. 70
Of course, such jurisdictional, technological, and political
limitations do not apply to all domestic laws. Yet, as we shall see
below, the momentum of the global economy and the newly found
power of a number of non-state actors help to construct what we
shall call the global state, a state whose actions stem increasingly
from the various economical and political pressures of global
competition and help to further the very processes with which it
is coping. Though there are many ways to conceive of the state's
role in the context of global competition, the choices involved are
not infinite. The structural changes in the global economy limit
the practical range of options available to a state.
Moreover, apart from the precise nature of the legal issues in
question, global competition itself imposes additional limits on statecentered law that arise from limitations placed on domestic politics.

Despite the global nature of the forces that create and limit the
choices a state can make, domestic politics often ignore the larger,
global dimension in which "local" issues are debated. When it comes
to the kinds of domestic politics that are emerging in the global era,
the capacity for distinguishing between purely domestic or global
situations seems limited. The interconnections and interdependence
fostered by the global economy may create a level of complexity that
encourages a one-size-fits-all political mentality and discourse. That
mentality is increasingly keyed to a conception of global competition
that is often oblivious to its limits, and encourages domestic politics
that usually are, at best, skeptical of attempts by states to intervene
in markets. These domestic attitudes often seem to advocate a kind
of global laissez-faire approach to a variety of issues, 7 1 as if we are
returning to a simpler, pre-New Deal age. As we shall see,7 2 this
mindset is deceptive, and can further a conception of the state that is
more like a return to the past than the creation of new approaches
appropriate for an interconnected global economy.
B. The Limits of Politics
The boundaries that surround national and state politics create
the possibility of zero-sum games with political consequences that
can be imposed by local electorates. If a majority believes that the
increase in costs generated by certain basic labor and safety

70.

See id.

71.
For various critiques of the use of the market as a substitute for
government, see THE GROUP OF LISBON, supra note 23, at 49-75; STATES AGAINST
MARKETS: THE LIMITS OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 60; see, e.g., ROBERT KUTTNER,
EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 328-61 (1997).
72.
See infra text accompanying notes 135-46, 192-98.
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guarantees are in accord with our national sense of who we are as a
people, laws will be passed that may increase costs but mitigate risks
for workers, or seek to redistribute wealth in politically acceptable
and accountable ways. The superimposition of global networks onto
these local political debates often changes the power relationships
involved. This can occur indirectly when states go ahead and
regulate in traditional ways, only to discover that they bear the
political costs of any plant closures or loss of jobs that may result. 73
More directly, an informal bargaining relationship may occur before
such regulation is passed, resulting in a state decision to abstain
from regulating in the first place.
For example, at the local
governmental level, discussions concerning tax relief and other
economic incentives available often determine whether a corporation
will decide to locate a facility in that locality.7 4 In addition, the rapid
ways in which capital investment moves from country to countryanalogized to a form of Casino Capitalism- 5-may make governments
rethink decisions that are perceived to raise costs on important
transnational actors before those decisions are applied. Indeed,
transnational corporations can bring jobs and capital investment to
a particular country and a region and city within that country. They
also can remove them.7 6 These non-state actors represent important
interest groups that affect state policies, but they also provide an
economic and political backdrop to the domestic debates that occur
77
between pro and anti-governmental approaches to problems.
The ability of transnational actors to avoid the consequences
of perceived negative regulatory decisions by focusing their
manufacturing or production activities elsewhere adds a very
practical dimension to any political debate on the role of
government.
The relevant body politic for transnational
corporations is a large one. It need not be the same body politic
for all of its functions-manufacturing, fabrication, distribution,
or sales. Depending upon the industry involved, 78 all of these
functions can and often do occur with varying degrees of intensity
79
in different parts of the world.

73.

See JUNE C. NASH, FROM TANKTOWN TO HIGH-TECH:
THE CLASH OF
(1989); see generally DANI RODRIK, HAS
GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (Inst. Of Economics, Wash. D.C., 1997).
74.
See generally ROBERT PERRUCCI, JAPANESE AUTO TRANSPLANTS IN THE
COMMUNITY AND INDUSTRIAL CYCLES

HEARTLAND: CORPORATISM AND COMMUNITY (1994).

75.

See STRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM, supranote 19, at 1-3.

76.
See, e.g., IMF Moves To Diminish Surprise Element of Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 1996, at 6; 1996 WL 7503351 (discussing the Mexican bail out).
77.
See STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 94-98.
78.
See DICKEN, supra note 32, at 231-382 (analyzing the globalization of
specific industries).

79.

See id.
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To a lesser extent, the same is true for individual citizens who
seek to do business abroad, 80 who work for transnational
corporations or industries in global competition, 8 ' or who
conceptualize problems such as the environment in ways that
necessitate involvement with transnational networks of concerned
citizens.8 2 These individuals' concept of global markets or global
problems broadens the relevant political communities to which
they relate and with whom they must deal. In solving political
problems such as the environment, they may have to unite
political communities that extend over many states. 83 The end
result is a body politic that is extended, and a diffusion of political
power that coincides with an increase in the number of global
actors and networks involved, as well as in the complexities of
political coordination necessary for significant political change to
occur. This is not necessarily the case in all industries or with all
regulatory problems, but the shift in focus from state-centered
approaches to problems to the more diffuse, global perspectives of
transnational non-state actors increasingly contributes to a
conception of the role of the state in a global economy that defers
to markets and emphasizes a competitive
model of global
84
capitalism across the regulatory board.
The creation of the politics necessary today to place global
issues on any legislative agenda or, indeed, in the public's
consciousness, is a complex task. Such efforts often involve
networks of individuals that extend beyond local boundaries, and
the use of media. For example, when media stories of sweat shop
labor threatened to tarnish the reputations of certain companies

80.
81.

See Jim Carlton, Think Big, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at 27.
See, e.g., Helena Norberg-Hodge, Shifting Direction: From Global

Dependence to Local Interdependence, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,

supra note 19 (arguing that the effect of globalization has been to weaken the
economies of small agricultural communities); see also David Morris,
Communities: Building Authority, Responsibility and Capacity, in THE CASE AGAINST
THE GLOBAL EcONOMY, supranote 19.
82.
See supranote 43.
83.
Coordinating the politics of such issues across borders is difficult in
itself, but transnational politics also involves more actors than ever before. States
are by no means the only players. Political networks that extend across borders
increasingly are formed and facilitated by non-governmental organizations
including, of course, transnational corporations, but also public interest groups
such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International. Indeed, the significance of a
variety of other non-state actors whose conceptions of problems are not limited by
geographical boundaries adds to the complexity of local and national politics. See
Wendy Schoener, Note, Non-Governmental Organizationsand Global Activism: Legal
and Informal Approaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 537 (1997).
84.
See GREIDER, supra note 32, at 11-26; STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE
STATE, supra note 6, at 3-16. But see STATES AGAINST MARKETS: THE LIMITS OF
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 60.
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(such as Nike) and certain individuals (such as Kathy Lee Gifford),
some informal steps were taken by these entities to try to meet
the criticisms involved. 85 Indeed, the diffuse nature of the politics
involved in such issues gives rise to alternatives to state-oriented
86
solutions to such problems, such as voluntary corporate codes.
In sum, structural changes in the global economy give rise to
significant changes in law and politics. As one commentator has
noted: "[11n the age of the networks, the relationship of the
citizens to the body politic is in competition with the infinity of
connections they establish outside it. So politics, far from being
the organizing principle of life in society, appears a secondary
activity, if not an artificial construct poorly suited to the
resolution of the practical problems of the modern world."87 This
change in politics thus fosters a fragmentation of power that
ultimately affects not only how particular decisions are made, but
88
the ability of some decisions to influence others.
Just as the community is no longer "contained" in the region,
which is no longer "contained" in the nation-state, the lesser
decision cannot be deduced from the greater. The crisis of the
spatial perception of power is thus felt in the formation of
decisions. These, rather than being taken in linear fashion, which
locks each entity into a precise competence, are fragmented, and
the traditional political debate, a debate about principles and
general ideas, an ideological debate, a debate over how society is to
be organized, fades away, or rather crumbles, a reflection of the
breakup of the decision process itself, and of its

professionalization. 8 9

The de-centering of politics that results thus makes it
difficult to mobilize opinion in ways that lead to effective political
change. Such limits on state-centered law and politics do not
mean the state has no role to play, but these limitations further
encourage an approach to the global economy that is largely
market-oriented, with the state's role focused increasingly and
primarily on how best to create, attract, and retain the economic
investment necessary to ensure prosperity for its inhabitants.
This, in turn, requires states to create the currency necessary to
compete effectively. Privatization, lower taxes, and less regulation
are the most common sources of this currency, but they should
not be the only purpose of the global state. Indeed, another

85.
See Charles S. Clark, Sweatshops and Use of Child Labor are Under
FirefromActivists All Over the World, DET. NEWS, Aug. 26, 1996, at A6.
86.
See, e.g., Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human
Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1963 (1996).
87.

JEAN-MARIE GUSHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE 19 (Victoria Elliott

trans., 1995).
88.
See id. at 20.
89.
See id.
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important role that the state will play involves the creation of the
structure and incentives necessary to balance global competition
with global cooperation, particularly in those areas that markets
90
alone cannot govern.

III. THE GLOBALIZING STATE
The changes in the global economy described in Part II are
fundamental, and predominantly structural in nature. The new
limits on law and politics are not simply the product of new
political tastes or trends. They are the result of a new kind of
complexity in the interplay of various legal jurisdictions: the
broadening of economic and political networks, a technologydriven capacity for rapid change and response to change, and an
increasingly large number of powerful non-state actors who, in
large part, derive their power from an ability to operate
simultaneously in a number of jurisdictions and to conceptualize
problems and opportunities without regard to state or national

boundaries.

The changing nature of the individuals and entities

that make up the state also contributes to the state's new role.
What role can and should the state play? What theory of the
state underlies this role and how is that theory related to practice
in domestic law and politics? This section shall examine these
questions. I will argue that the rhetoric of global competition
provides states with what appears to be a wholly domestic
agenda, but one that masks fundamental changes in the
underlying theory of the state driving that rhetoric and the
realities of global competition. I will then argue that different
conceptions of the state might be consistent with its actions, but
that these theories of the state have very different implications for
the role of law.
A. Global Competition
William Croskey, a leading Constitutional law scholar in the
1940s and 1950s, argued for a conception of the Commerce
Clause in his seminal treatise on Constitutional law, that, taken
to its logical conclusion, applied to commerce among human
beings who happened to live in states. 9 1 Thus, movement of
goods between states was not necessary for him to conclude

90.

For a discussion of various alternatives and supplements to market

approaches, see THE GROUP OF LISBON, supranote 23, at 107-40.
91.
See WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 93 (1953).
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interstate commerce was involved. Impact on human beings who
lived in states was enough. This broad reading accorded with the
powers of the national government as he perceived them and the
"eighteenth century passion for uniform private law in the field of
commerce." 9 2 In today's world of increasingly integrated global
markets, it is also logical to think of nation-states as territories in
which commerce occurs between the human beings who happen
to live there. Of course, a state has a number of functions that
ensure that this kind of economic activity can occur, as well as
duties that go beyond ensuring the financial well-being of its
residents. Safety, health, education, and basic human rights are
also functions of the state and they are not unrelated to the goal
93
of economic prosperity.
The global economy interacts with the way the state
functions today, placing a premium on markets, and organizing
economic life in ways that do not adhere to the geographic
boundaries of existing states. With the demise of the Cold War,
the idea of states as self-contained units establishing a balance of
power is less useful when it comes to the fluidity of borders and
the increasing irrelevance of territory per se in determining who is
and who is not successful in the global economy.9 4
One

important way of both emphasizing the new, more marketoriented, aspects of the global economy without giving up the
rhetoric and concept of a strong state is to conceptualize its role
as leading the fight for prosperity in the global economy. For
some, the appropriate political rhetoric is one which describes the
state as, in effect, a combatant in a new war, a war for markets
and jobs.9 5 Thus, one way states distinguish themselves from the
structural economic power of transnational corporations, while
adopting policies that are largely in sync with transnational
corporations' global economic conception of the world, is to adopt
a state-centered model of law based on global competition. States
thus remain important players because their actions can help
determine the extent to which economic prosperity occurs within
their own borders.
Accordingly, the global political economy has spawned a
competitiveness that is, at the extremes, comparable to laissez-

92.
93.

Id. at 82.
See generallyJean Drdze & Amnartya Sen, INDIA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY 13-16 (1995).
94.
See generally JOSEPH A.

CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF
SOVEREIGNTY?, 166-67 (1992); see also STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supra
note 6, at 21-23.
95.
See generallyJOHN LEWIs GADDIS, WE NOW KNOW: RETHINKING COLD WAR
HISTORY (1997).
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faire capitalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 9 6
Rather than seem overwhelmed by the power of worldwide
markets, the state seeks to use these market forces to maximize
the economic prosperity of its own citizens.
In so doing, it
furthers a model of globalization that is focused on individualism,
a liberal conception of the economy, a limited conception of the
97
role of the state, self-reliance, and competitiveness.

Market values can, of course, be tempered by government (as
they have been on the national level since the New Deal) but the
realities of global competition and the de-centered aspects of the
state described above accentuate these values. 98 The end result
of the development of this type of global capitalism is one that
encourages rhetoric that pits country against country, state
against state, and firm against firm, in the quest for economic
dominance and prosperity. 99 This sense of competition and the
desire to dominate world markets so as to increase jobs and
prosperity within the territory of a particular state has led to a
political conception of the state centered around its need to
participate effectively in the global competition that characterizes
our world today. 10 0
Not only does this often yield investment-friendly regulatory and
tax policies, but it also pressures states to maximize their own
efficiency and effectiveness.' 0 ' More than simple corporate mimicry
is involved, though the ability of the state to speak the language of
cost containment, downsizing, and re-engineering in today's world

96.
See, e.g., GREIDER, supranote 32, at 172-73.
97.
Id. at 369-70. Many argue that this model is peculiarly American.
See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.

37 (1993). Others note that this model is more common to global capitalism in
general.

But see GUPHENNO, supra note 87, at 30-31, ("Certainly, the United

States pushes to the limit the logic of the confirmation of interests in which the
idea of a general good is dissolved ....
But the extreme case can help to shed
light on the average situation, and the American crisis is an indication of our
future."). Id.

98.
99.

See, e.g., GREIDER, supranote 32, at 35-38.
Id. See also PAUL KRUGMAN, supra note 23, at 15-21.

100.

See Cerny, What Next for the State?, supranote 6, at 132-33 ("The main

focus of the competition state in the world . . . is the promotion of economic
activities, whether at home or abroad, which will make firms and sectors located

within the territory of the state competitive in internationalmarkets."); see also A
Competitive Strategy for America, Second Report To The President and Congress,
Competitiveness Policy Council, Washington, D.C., at 79 (March 1993).
101.
See generally Aman, Administrative Law ForA New Century, supranote
17; see also Symposium, Privatization: The Global Scale-Back of Government
Involvement in National Economies, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 435 (1996) (surveying the
theory, practice, and potential of privatization of the world's economics); JANE
KELSEY, EcONOMIC FUNDAMENTALISM (1995) (analyzing the shift to corporatist
approaches in New Zealand).
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undoubtedly adds to its political legitimacy.102 More importantly, the
very policies a state employs to lower costs (to attract investment to
its territory) necessitates new, cost-effective regulatory techniques of
its own. But even beyond such economic necessities and the
resulting cost-based regulatory reform, the fundamental nature of
the state itself is changing. Many citizens who happen to reside
within a particular state's borders have choices to move about, and
they can and do exercise these choices. Those that do not have such
choices may not fully or even partially identify with the state for their
economic livelihood, especially if they work for global companies or

are in a business that is in global competition.' 03 The question of
who makes up the state and which interests matter, and how these
issues affect the ability of a state to act in any particular focused
way, is a much more open question when the "war" involved is
neither cold nor h6t, but economic. 104
Has it not always been thus? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense
that economic prosperity has always been important, but no in
the sense that global competition has never been so fierce or
structured in such borderless ways. 10 5 The kinds of Cold War
activities that gave states their official meaning and provided a
certain kind of national unity no longer exist to the same
degree.' 0 6 Yet this does not mean the state is withering away, nor
does it mean that the state is simply the sum total of the
preferences of its many global and local inhabitants at any given

time. 10 7 Although the state reflects a more diverse, less centered

source of power, it remains an important means of maintaining a
public component in policymaking decisions. The extent to which
a state's power can be used to further a collectively derived public
interest goal has been a major issue in modem public law
debates.1 0 8 The need to achieve a global conception of the public
interest is even more difficult, but this is the challenge of the
state and transnational politics. The diffuse nature of the issues

102.

For a discussion of how state regulatory approaches often borrow from

private forms and structures, see Aman, The Earth As Eggshell Victim, supranote
32, at 2118; see also Aman, Administrative Law ForA New Century, supranote 17,
at 90-91.
103.
See generally Gu9iHENNO, supranote 87, at 23.
104.
See supra note 36, at 301-15 (asking the question "who is us?" in light
of an increasingly denationalized global economy).
105.
Id. at 119-35; see also, DICKEN, supranote 32, at 13-14.
106. Id.
107. The state, despite its diversity, has a distinct role to play. See, e.g.,
BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985); STATES AGAINST
MARKETS: THE LIMITS OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 60. But see PETER SELF,
GOVERNMENT BY THE MARKET 4-20 (1993).

108.

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38

STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
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involved and the difficulty of creating the politics necessary to
create a global conception of the public interest facilitates the
ability of essentially market approaches to dominate domestic and
global discourses.
In response, a more corporatist role for states may be
emerging as states try to do more than simply reflect the sum
total of the preferences of their inhabitants, and instead seek to
assert their view of the public interest. Such an approach sees
the state's role as something more than a neutral arbiter of the
interest group politics that predominate a pluralistic conception of
the state. It also differs from more public choice conceptions of
the state, where it is assumed that certain, dominant interests
will exercise more control over the state than the more neutral,
Indeed, for public choice
pluralistic conception envisages.
theorists, the idea of the existence of a collective public interest is
undermined. A corporatist approach is not as democratic in its
approach as other forms of interest group behavior, but it does
posit the existence of a public interest, one which the state tries
to further. In this way the state is, in a sense, just another actor
(though obviously a very powerful one) but not nearly as
independent as the pluralists or republicans might imagine; nor
as susceptible to capture or manipulation as the public choice
09
theorists might assume. 1
The changes in the state thus far range from structural
economic changes in the way non-state and state actors operate,
to political changes in the way the role of the state is
conceptualized. The end result of these changes is enormous
competition between, within, and among states for investment,
and a regulatory language and approach that, in many ways, has
become corporatized itself, if not privatized. A common way for
government at federal, state, and local levels to conceptualize
itself is as something akin to a corporate entity that provides
services to its customer/citizens and attracts jobs and capital to
its locale." 0 It is as if the state itself is an individual or a
transnational corporation locked in competition with other
individuals or transnational corporations for success in a series of
zero-sum political and economic games. When Toyota chooses
one country over another for the location of its plant, or one state
over another and one locale within that state as opposed to
another, there is essentially a multiplier effect when it comes to
the various competitions that take place between governmental

109.

For a discussion of corporatist theory, see P. P.

CRAIG,

PUBLIC

LAW AND

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 148-53

(1990). See also A. CAWSON, CORPORATISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 22-46 (1986).
110.

See PERRUCCI,

supra note

74, at 81.
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entities to attract prosperity to their respective territorial space.
There are strong pressures on each level of government to assist
in this competition that are bottom-up in their impact. That is to
say, even if federal regulations subject all states to the same
federal costs (a level playing field), that does not necessarily mean
that some states or local units do not believe that they could be
more "efficient," and therefore competitive, given the chance to do
SO.

The welfare reform debate in the United States is a case in
point. One of the cost considerations driving welfare reform from
a state perspective was the desire on the part of states to control
their own costs and make their own determinations of how best to
distribute federal and state funds in order to deal with those who
could not compete effectively in the global economy."'
Their
belief in their own management skills and decisions created a
corresponding belief in their ability to lower welfare costs in their
states, thereby increasing their own productivity. 112 Thus, states
in global competition are not content to have a level playing field
when it comes to welfare costs, if they believe they can cut those
costs, achieve their goals, and thereby out-compete other states
in attracting foreign investment.
Indeed, all such common
expenditures among states become the source of currency with
which they can compete against each other.
The pressures from below state governments are even greater.
Since municipalities within a state wish to compete effectively for
investment in their own communities, they too want their state to
have rules and regulations that are more cost-effective than those
imposed on nearby communities in neighboring states. If a state
wishes to be successful, it must help its own local communities to
attract jobs to their cities. Since it is at the local level that the end
result of this competition is finally realized-for example, a plant or
facility may or may not be built-it is not surprising that the
competition at the local level might be particularly fierce and a
relatively pure corporatist approach to decision-making increasingly
1 13
common.
The competitive philosophy so prevalent in the ways that all
levels of governments now seek to compete for jobs and investment
within their own territories is a derivative of the competition that

111.

See, e.g., Robert Pear, Federa, State Officials Spar Over Welfare

Spending, L.A. DAILY NEWs, Dec. 26, 1996, at N22.
112.
Id.
113.
See PERRUCCI, supra note 74, at 1-20 (describing and analyzing the
competition among various Midwestern states for Japanese auto plants, and
noting that a kind of corporatism characterized the decision-maling processes at
the state and local levels that led to the financial incentives necessary to attract

this investment).
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occurs among transnational corporations at the global level. That
competition usually is characterized as fierce.' 1 4 In response, states
have adopted not only the dominant rhetoric of the private sector,
but often many of the private sector's structures, goals, and means of
operation as well." s Increasingly, governments at all levels play the
game as if they were transnational corporations. Such an approach
can yield a conception of government that is so market driven as to
raise significant concerns about important non-market values, such

as those embodied in certain provisions of the U.S. Constitution, as
well as the limits of the market metaphor when it comes to
governmental decision-making and the role of individual citizens. As
we shall see, if privatization of persons means the deprivation of
constitutional rights of prisoners, 11 6 or if contracting-out snow
removal or garbage collection 1 17 means that politics is viewed as
separate and distinct from administration, democracy and
constitutional rights will suffer. There are, in effect, limits to the
sources of currency available to states for competing effectively in the
global economy.

114.

As noted in THE GROUP OF LISBON, supranote 23, at xiii:

Competing in the global economy--characterized today by the emergence
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B. The Limits of Competition
There are many forms which a competitive model of global
capitalism may take, many of which are more cooperative than a
simple laissez-faire model might predict.1 1 8 Moreover, there are
degrees to which the state can respond to the rhetoric of global
competition, particularly since not all industries within a state are
in global competition to the same extent and the state itself is not
akin to a unified corporate entity. The state need not and should

not see itself only in terms that might be appropriate for
transnational corporations.
This is because effective global
governance requires more than only
individuals and firms. At the state level,

competition

among

the pursuit of competition in search of profit as the single
legitimate overarching concern of firms is unjustified as the main
motivation for private and public choices in a world of increasingly
global processes, problems, and interdependence. Competition
among firms alone cannot handle long-term world problems
efficiently. The market cannot properly discount the future: it is
naturally shortsighted. Putting together thousands of myopic
organizations does not enable them, individually or collectively, to
see the reality and acquire a sense of direction, or to provide
governance, order, and security. The same applies to competition
among nations, which, in excess, inevitably leads to a rat-race
mentality and global economic wars and hinders the ability of
1 9
policymakers to address national and global priorities.
The rhetoric of competition and the market metaphor can, at

times, dictate governmental responses that are wholly in tune
with the rhetoric of the market and global competition, but
nonetheless inappropriate. For example, there are many policy
choices that are said to be required by global competition, when,
in fact, they may not be. The issues are much more complex, as
Professor Krugman has argued:
Most people who use the term "competitiveness" do so without a
second thought. It seems obvious to them that the analogy between
a country and a corporation is reasonable and that to ask whether
the United States is competitive in the world market is no different
in principle from asking whether General Motors is competitive in
the North American minivan market.
In fact, however, trying to define the competitiveness of a nation
is much more problematic than defining that of a corporation. The

bottom line for a corporation is literally its bottom line: if a
corporation cannot afford to pay its workers, suppliers, and
bondholders, it will go out of business. So when we say that a
corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is

118.

THE GROUP OF LISBON, supra note 23, at 121-40.

119.

Id. at xvi-xvii.
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unsustainable-that unless it improves its performance, it will
cease to exist. Countries, on the other hand, do not go out of
business. They may be happy or unhappy with their economic
performance, but they have no well-defined bottom line. As a

result, the concept of national competitiveness is elusive. 120

Moreover, there are obvious limits to other metaphors
spawned by global competitiveness, particularly when they are
applied to citizens. 12 1
The role of citizen-as-customer, for
example, is a passive one. It assumes too bright a line between
what government does and who the government is. 12 2 Citizensas-owners is often a more appropriate analogy. 123
The
citizen/ customer
metaphor,
however,
also
implies
that
citizen/customers have a choice when it comes to, for example,
certain municipal services. 124 This usually is not the case, and
citizens must accept a certain provider for at least the duration of
the contract involved.
Moreover, the citizen-as-customer
metaphor has implications for the way we think about the service
performed by private providers. l 2 5 It suggests that there is a
bright line between the service provided and policymaking, as if
all of the policy is made when government decides to contract out
a certain service. 12 6 In reality, the public's role or interest in the
activities contracted out does not end at the delegation stage-i.e.,
the point at which the contract is signed. How a service provider
goes about the job involves any number of policy choices over
which there often is no public input. By privatizing the concept of
citizenship, the implicit assumption of most such reforms is that
citizens will know if they like the service they are getting, but they
are not expected to be players in the fundamental policy decisions
that determine whether, how, and to whom those services should
12 7
be dispensed.
As we shall see below, one of the major concerns with
privatization and globalization is that issues that once were public
and subject to democratic decision-making processes are, once
privatized, removed from public view. The lack of democracy or
democratic outlets built into such decision-making structures

120.

KRUGMAN, supranote 23, at 5-6.

121.
See generally HINDY LAUER SCHACHTER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT OR
REINVENTING OURSELVES (1997).

122.
123.
124.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 9.
For an analysis of how markets for municipal services differ from other

markets for goods, see IAN HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE (1992).

125.

Id. at 1-6; see also Marc Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses To

Privatisationand Outsourcing, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note

17, at 40.
126. Id. at 43.
127. Id.
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may create incentives on the part of the state to choose
metaphors such as citizens-as-customers and thereby legitimate
state activities and decisions without public input and with
increasingly narrow, market justifications. Indeed, though there
are clear limits when it comes to the ways in which the paradigm
of global competition applies to states, the market, competitionbased metaphor itself can mask a variety of assumptions
concerning both the role of the state and the role that public law
can play in various regulatory contexts. Because familiar political
debates involving the appropriate role of government vis-CA-vis the
market easily can fit within the rhetoric of global competition, it is
easy simply to assume that market approaches are better than
regulatory approaches or that the pendulum is simply swinging in
the direction of less government for the time being. This kind of
rhetoric makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that significant
structural changes in the ability of the state to act effectively are
at work, changes that necessitate new conceptualizations of the
role of law and of politics, not simply the adoption of global
competition as a metaphor. Because the way that the state reacts
to globalization is capable of various interpretations, some of
which simply reinforce the politics of the past, it is useful to
examine three of these basic interpretations of the state's
domestic reactions to the global economy, two of which draw
heavily on previous conceptions of the state and public law and
one of which points in a new direction.
C. Three Approaches to the Relationship of Globalizationto
Domestic Law and Politics

The global economy encourages a politics of competitiveness
that is both real and, at times, excessive.
The values of
competition resonate with certain fundamental values such as
liberty and individualism and they can lend credibility to
traditional domestic arguments that have long been part of the
political debates over the appropriate roles of government vis-a-vis
the market, especially the federal government. 1 2 8 For analytical

128.
See, e.g., Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-121, 110 Stat. 847 et seq. (1996) (emphasizing a minimalist role for the
federal government in economic areas); see Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of
1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (1997) (ending the imposition of Federal mandate

without adequate funding on state's local governments); Risk Assessment and
Cost-Benefit Analysis Act of 1995, H.R. 690, 104th Cong., (1995) (attempting to

create an Office of Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis in federal
agencies); Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., (1995)

(asserting that "no law or agency action should limit the use of privately owned
property so as to diminish its value").
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purposes, it is helpful to differentiate among three approaches to
domestic law reform and politics, recognizing, of course, that such
categories are never totally pure; they overlap in many ways, but
they also represent significantly different starting points for
analysis.
One approach derives from the conception of a strong state,
capable of imposing its will at home and, if necessary, abroad. A
common version of this approach seeks to revive laissez-faire
capitalism in the context of global capitalism, by linking domestic
economic reform with economic approaches that dominate at the
global level. To this end, strong state laissez-faire proponents
12 9
emphasize the importance of low taxes and minimal regulation.
This approach sometimes coincides with libertarian approaches to
constitutional issues, such as the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment, or other constitutional interpretive approaches that
substantially limit the regulatory powers of government, especially
the federal government. 130
Alternatively, other strong state
regulators believe it is possible to maintain and improve upon
current regulatory structures and approaches to achieve domestic
goals. 131
A second approach represents the state as the object of
"reinvention." The reinvention of government movement 3 2 seeks
to streamline government to make it more competitive and
efficient. As different as the more market-oriented discourse
sounds when it comes to discussing citizens as customers, there
is also an implied status quo aspect to this approach to

129.
130.

Id.
See H.R. 925 § 3(a), which was the most prohibitive of the legislative

proposals dealing with the compensation of property rights. It required that the
federal government:

compensate an owner of property whose use of any portion of that
property has been limited by an agency action, under a specified
regulatory law, that diminishes the fair market value of that portion by 20
percent or more. The amount of the compensation shall equal the

diminution in value that resulted from the agency action.
H.R. 925 § 3(a).
131.
See, e.g., Mark A. Hoffman, Nader Faults EPA as Lax on Enforcement,
BUS. INS., May 1, 1995, at 46-47.
132. A prime example is Vice President Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results:
Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less (REP. OF THE NAT'L

PERFORMANCE REV.) (1993) [hereinafter National Performance Review].
For a
discussion of this report, see Jeffery S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National
Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 DUKE L.J. 1165
(1994); Daniel. B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of
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(1994); Paul R. Verkuil, Is Efficient Government an Oxymoron?, 43 DUKE L.J. 1221
(1994).
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governance. It assumes that producing a government that works
better and costs less can come solely from structural and
procedural changes within the government itself rather than
substantive changes. 13 3 The market and market forces are but a
means to an end, and those ends often are intended to be
essentially the same as before. Market approaches and market
discourses, however, can change more than simply the means by
which governments act. Not all public law values are capable of
being translated into a cost-benefit discourse. 13 4 Inevitably, there
is something lost in translation when citizens are viewed primarily
as customers or consumers rather than active participants in the
public policy issues the provision of government services embody.
Moreover, at times, the attempt to apply a market discourse to
regulatory problems may be a substitute for a kind of procedural
laissez-faireism, falling more into the first category above.
There are limits to the extent to which the market metaphor
can apply effectively to public services or functions without
changing outcomes. The third approach to law reforms is closely
akin to the efficient state model just described. We shall call this
approach globalization because the globalizing state is being
transformed by the processes of globalization and plays an active
role in those processes. The globalizing state is both an agent of
globalization and an entity that is itself shaped and changed by
these very processes of which it is a part. This approach blends
public and private power in ways aimed at maintaining the
importance of a public role, even though a market discourse may

be prominent.

Moreover, the use of the market and market

approaches does not necessarily imply a status quo ante
approach. Performing governmental tasks more efficiently is not
the only goal. Change in the form, structure, and substance of
regulatory approaches is also contemplated.
Indeed, the
globalizing state seeks to maintain a public perspective on
transnational issues as well as recognize that multigovernmental
approaches and the involvement of non-state actors may be
increasingly necessary if the state is to be active-even in issues
that once were thought to be wholly private and domestic in
nature.
We shall now expand on each of these three major
approaches to lawmaking and law reform.

133.
SCHACHTER, supranote 121, at 2-3.
134.
Id. See generally MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988)
(arguing that social regulation "responds to a need to make markets more
humane, not necessarily to -make them more efficient").
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1. Back to the Future-The Strong State
One assumption that can be made regarding the global
political economy is that the state, especially the United States,
remains strong and in control of its own destiny.13 5 There are at
least two polar versions of the strong state thesis and both involve
domestic political and legal responses that clearly resonate with
long-standing political assumptions and public law theories, both
domestic and international.
A rhetorical approach to global competition that fits easily with
the realities of today's global economy is to return to a conception of
the minimal state,1 3 6 especially at the federal level. Deregulation,
privatization, lower taxes, and smaller and less intrusive government
when it comes to economic issues, are seen by strong state reformers
as ends in themselves. 13 7 A market economy knows no boundaries,
and this fact, along with the additional impetus the ideology of
competition receives from global competition, mandates a return to
the pre-New Deal state. Such an approach coincides with the shift
occurring from states to markets outlined above, but the market
approaches that result are not simply because of the difficulties in
asserting regulatory control over transnational actors and
on the
transnational problems; they represent an affirmative choice
38
part of a strong state to reimpose a laissez-faire economy.1
Along with this assumption of a strong state are certain
assumptions about law, particularly the law that governs
governmental actions and the boundaries between public and
private powers and state and federal jurisdiction. Perhaps the
most significant aspect of a laissez-faire, strong state conception
of global competition, is the need for a clearly defined line
between public and private powers. The purpose of privatization
and deregulation is to return decision-making back to the private
sector, where private ordering and a market economy, coupled
with clear property rights and effective criminal law enforcement,
will supply the structure, order, stability, and rules needed for the
economy to prosper. Thus, the diffusion of state power, especially

135.

See generally ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS (1987) (inquiring how the interaction of the state and market is
transforming international relations); JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO LEAD: THE
CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER (1990) (examining the transition of
international power in the twentieth century and the role of the United States as a

leader).
See NOZICK, supranote 4.
136.
Id.; see James Gerstenzang & Marc Lacey, Gore, Kemp Clash on Tax
137.
Cuts and Economic Growth Politics, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at Al (quoting Jack
Kemp as stating that the U.S. economy is "overtaxed" and "overregulated").
CRAIG, supra note 109, at 153-57.
138.
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at the federal level, coupled with the jurisdictional problems
encountered by states that attempt to regulate transnational
actors, technologies, or problems, all encourage moving as much
power as possible from the public to the private sector. Such a
view would be consistent with approaches to state action and
privatized governmental services that seek to maximize the role of
the private sector, and the private values and operating
3 9
procedures this implies.,
If a public response in the form of law is necessary, it should,
to the extent possible, occur at the most local level of

government. 140 Thus, another structural legal assumption that
underlies the strong laissez-faire state thesis is that there should
41
be clear lines between national, state, and local governments.'
This sense of what the appropriate allocation of governmental
power should be is, essentially, a pre-New Deal approach to the
federalism aspects of the Constitution. It conforms to the idea
that national power should be decentralized and minimal and
that this is a federal choice. Not unlike the balanced budget
amendment,' 42 constitutionalizing such basic premises and
removing even the temptation of choice often is seen as a
desirable outcome by advocates of this position. Of course, a
truly strong national state might pass federal laws mandating
certain laissez-faire approaches at the state level, if necessary. In
general, however, the federal government's leadership comes in
maximizing the economic freedom of its citizens, rather than in
trying to micro-manage various markets or problems best left to
the private sector and, if necessary, individual states.
This particular laissez-faire view of the state does not play
itself out in a pure form, 43 but it is strongly evident in the
isolationist approaches of some policymakers to international law
as well as to approaches to free trade and, more domestically,

139.
See, e.g., Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach to state action in NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978); Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co., 419 U.S. 345, (1974); Moose Lodge 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); see also Cerny, What Next For the State?, supranote
6, at 130 ("[G]Iobalization entails the undermining of the public characterof public
goods and of the specific character of specific assets, i.e. the privatization and
marketizationof economic and political structures.").
140.
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
141.
Id.
142.
H.R.J. Res. 52, 105th Cong. (1997).
143.
For example, many strong state laissez-faire advocates in the economic
sphere often support state intervention on social issues. See ANDREW GAMBLE,
THE FREE ECONOMY AND THE STRONG STATE 35 (1988); see also Dan Carney, School

Prayer Delayed by GOP Squabbles, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2529 (1996)
(discussing social conservatives' proposed constitutional amendment to protect
school prayer).
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certain cost-benefit analysis approaches at the regulatory level. 144
Adding an explicit cost-benefit dimension to regulatory processes

can mean many things, but in the context of strong state laissezfaire advocates, it can be a means by which procedures are used
to achieve substantive ends-i.e., minimal or no governmental
action. 14 5
Indeed, market discourses can not only refine

governmental choices and decision-making, but, depending upon
how one defines cost and benefit, they can also substantially limit
the substantive role of the state.
The politics generated by advocates of a strong, laissez-faire
state is remarkably similar to traditional political debates between
conservatives and liberals, with the market, freedom, and liberty
placed in opposition to command and control regulation, federal
bureaucracies, and governmental intervention. The bright lines
between the public and the private, government and markets,
rights and freedoms, among and between nations (as in the
immigration debates), and between nations and internal states,
all reinforce legal and political debates that appear to continue
without regard to the very different economy and world in which
we live today. They also reinforce a political theory of the state
that suggests that, when it comes to intervention into the market

144. See the isolationist positions of some conservative senators, such as
Jesse Helms's proposed Foreign Relations Revitalization Act (S.908), which would
have eliminated the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency 141 CONG. REC.
S18617-02 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1995) (statements of Sen. Helms). See also Helms's
opposition to the International Chemical Weapons Convention, 143 CONG. REC.
S3570-628 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Helms), and some of the
more extreme APA cost-benefit reforms of the 104th Congress designed more to
ensure agency inaction than any real reform, such as the Comprehensive
Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S.343, 104th Cong. 1995.
145. Using process to achieve substantive results that prevent

governmental intervention is a kind of laissez-faire proceduralism. See Paul R.
Verkufl, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure,78 COLUM. L. REV. 258,
264 (1978). As Professor Verkuil has noted with respect to early United States
administrative law:
[T]he substantive values of the nineteenth-century liberal, noninterventionist state and the procedural values of the common-law,
adversary model of decision-maling have a common core and are
mutually supportive.
Both sets of values reflected a common
philosophical premise that the correct result would be achieved by the free
clash of competing forces in the marketplace, or courtroom. As Jerome
Frank noted, the 'fight [or adversary] theory of justice is a sort of legal
laissez-faire.'
Id. (quoting JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 92 (1949)). For a case study of how Congress used procedure and agency
structure to constrain the abilities of a regulatory agency, the Department of
Energy, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis: Some
Structuraland ProceduralLessons, 65 CORNELL*L. REv. 491 (1980).
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economy, there is no public interest beyond what the market itself
might provide. 146
A second type of strong state response to the global economy

decries deregulation and privatization and is especially skeptical
of international regulatory approaches to issues. 147 This vision of
the state resurrects its own nostalgia for the past. It assumes
that the state can simply regulate markets as we always have and
the rest of the world will either cope or follow our lead. 148 The
global aspects of today's markets, actors, and technologies need
not limit our responses, if we can muster the political will to
act. 14 9 By setting the appropriate regulatory standards at home,
we can set standards for the rest of the world. If they do not
choose to follow our lead, that should not inhibit our use and
further development of a strong regulatory approach and a public
50
law based on transparency and participation. 1
Not unlike the strong state response of the laissez-faire
advocates, those who advocate the regulatory strong state
response also believe in a public/private dichotomy, but the
public sphere, particularly when it comes to the economic and
environmental well being of individuals, is a broad one, while the
private sphere is not.1 5 1 What is private relates more to rights
such as individual privacy, or the separation of church and
state.' 5 2 Given the need for uniformity and the fear of a "race to
the bottom" when it comes to economic legislation, they advocate
strong national regulation and a view of states that substantially
limits their freedom from uniform and unifying national
15 3
regulation.

146.
See SELF, supranote 107, at 48-69.
147.
See Uruguay Round Agreements of the GeneralAgreements on Tariffs
and Trade: HearingBefore the House Small Business Commission (Apr. 265, 1994)

(testimony of Ralph Nader), available in 1994 WL 230684 ("[Dlecisions arising
from such [international] governance can pull down our higher living standards in
key areas or impose trade fines and sanctions until such deregulation is
accepted.") [hereinafter Nader].
148.
Id.
149.
See Alissa J. Rubin, Buchanan'sProtectionism Slows Trade Agenda, 54
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 532 (March 2, 1996) (discussing Patrick Buchanan's antitrade rhetoric in the context of the 1995 trade deficit); see also Eat Your NAFTA,
EcONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1995, at 15 (discussing Ross Perot's anti-NAFTA stance).
150.
See Nader, supranote 147.
151.
See Martin Crutsinger, Clinton Pushing to Expand Free Trade in Latin
America, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 11, 1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL 4861704
(discussing Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Trade Watch's assertion that a recent
outbreak of hepatitis among Michigan school children caused by Mexican
strawberries was the result of weak Mexican regulation).
152.
See supra note 141.
153.
See Family Self-Sufficiency Act (H.R. 4), 141 CONG. REc. S11735-784

(daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (containing statements of Sen. Wellstone opposing block
grants to the states because they would "lower the floor of federal protection").
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While debates between these strong state advocates often
predictably focus on what should be public and private, or a
federal as opposed to a state issue, the debate can sometimes be
less predictable when it comes to the role that free trade and
treaties (such as NAFTA) or legislation (such as fast-track) should
play in our economy.'- 4 The strong state free-traders are usually
eager to expand markets in whatever ways they can, especially if
more wage and job competition results in the U.S. 15 5 The strong
state regulators fear that domestic legal institutions will be
undermined, and private power will be greatly enhanced at the
expense of public control and public law values. 15 6 At the
extremes of the regulatory view are those who advocate direct
forms of economic protectionism as a response to global
competition. 157 Less extreme is a view that would negate free
trade agreements such as NAFTA in the absence of clear
158
regulatory solutions to environmental, wage, and labor issues.
In summary, one response to the global economy is to assert
the strong will of the state either in a manner that seeks to
maximize competition at home and abroad, or one that seeks to
soften, if not minimize it at home. Both views, however, assume a
theory of the state in which states are the primary actors in the
international system and have substantial control over their own
national economy. 15 9 This view of the state, however, and the

154. See the differences on this issue among liberal democrats who
otherwise support national legislation. See Fast Track Negotiating Authority:
Hearings Before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transp. Comm. (Sept. 30,
1997), available in 1997 WL 6056 (discussing the president's request .for fasttrack authority).
155. See NAFTA Membershipfor Chile: Hearings Before the Trade Subcomm.
of the House Ways and Means Comm. (June 21, 1995) (testimony of Charlene
Barshefsky), available in 1995 WL 373535 ("expanding trade is critical to our
efforts to create good, high-wage jobs").
156. Ralph Nader has argued that "GATT sets up an apparatus that is
secretive, inaccessible and unappealing to decide disputes and harmonize
standards-in our case downward-by subordinating and therefore subjugating
critical health and safety consumer issues, environmental issues and workplace
issues to the imperatives of commercial trade." Nader Blasts GATT, FIN. PosT Dec.
23, 1993, at 1.
157. See Is Free Trade Good or Bad for America?, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 14,
1997, available in 1997 WL 12560888 (containing comments made by AFL-CIO
president Charles Wowkaneck explaining the AFL-CIOs opposition to fast track
legislation: "[American labor] can't compete with $2 wages").
158. See All Things Considered: Richard Gephardt Announces Opposition to
Nafta (National Public Radio radio broadcast, Sept. 21, 1993) ("[Mlembers of
Congress who come to oppose or vote to oppose this NAFTA are not protectionist

and we're not against Mexico. We simply believe that passing a NAFTA that fails
to ensure sensible Mexican wage increases... is worse than no NAFTA at all.").
159. In some ways, these strong state views are somewhat akin to the
realists' position vis-&-vis the state in international relations theory. The state is
viewed as a unified whole. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, supranote 21, at 722.
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public law and policy that flows from it, is no longer in accord
with the realities of the global economy today, unless states and
their citizenry are willing to ignore the impact of a pure laissezfaire economy on those who are unable to compete effectively, or,
in the alternative, take actions that substantially raise the costs
60
of those doing business within their borders.'
2. Reinventing Government-The Efficient State
As previously noted, a different way of conceptualizing the
state is as a unit made up of individuals and groups, whose
preferences matter and whose preferences increasingly are formed
beyond national borders.161 Quite apart from whether the state is
strong or weak relative to global markets, the reinventing
government movement tries to maintain active state involvement,
but it assumes the state must act differently than it has in the
past. States need not, however, withdraw state power completely
in favor of the power of markets. The goal of governmental
efficiency is asserted in place of the ideological regulation or
deregulation debate. Indeed, at the heart of the reinvention of
government approach is its belief that procedural and structural
legal reform make it possible to have a government that works
better and costs less. 162 Such reforms resonate with the global
competition discourse of today in part because of the market
rhetoric such approaches produce and the greater reliance now
placed on market approaches to regulation and bureaucratic
structures. The reinvention approach also produces government
that "looks like" or, at least, sounds like the private entities with
63
which it deals and tries to influence.'
Turning to the private sector for ideas is not unusual.
Governments, especially activist governments, have usually
borrowed their regulatory forms and structures from the very
entities they seek to influence and control. In the New Deal, for
example, government borrowed heavily from the more fluid
organizational conceptions of corporations when it came to
designing the internal structures of independent regulatory

160.
See Thomas Sanction, A New French 7Twist, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 54
(discussing the effects of Lionel Jospin's job creation proposals on France's plan
to join the single European currency); see also France Still Trapped, EcONOMIST,
July 5, 1997, at 51.
161.
For an analogy to this view of the state, see Anne-Marie Slaughter,
supranote 21, at 727-28 (describing a liberal theory of international relations).
162.
See National Performance Review, supra note 132; see also Aman, A
GlobalPerspective On Current Regulatory Reform, supranote 59, at 450-5 1.
163. An example of this on the international level is the private standards
called ISO 14000. See infra note 237.
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agencies. 16 4
Strict separation of power approaches were
eschewed in favor of a more practical governmental model,
borrowing from large corporations concepts of internally shared
responsibility and power. 165

The reinvention approach to the state also borrows heavily
from the corporate sector, including its decision to downsize,
decentralize, and, more generally, re-engineer its own
bureaucratic structures and procedures to maximize its global
competitiveness. 1 6 6 The increase in direct global competition
from other corporate entities, coupled with potential opportunities
to expand in worldwide markets may drive many companies to
lower their costs and maximize their flexibility. In this regard, the
web-like nature of transnational corporations is perhaps the
ultimate form of this drive for efficiency. 167 Sometimes processes
are farmed out to subsidiaries in other countries; l6 8 other times
less lengthy or formal relationships are involved, as various tasks
are contracted out to a variety of independent contractors to
16 9
ensure that the lowest cost providers can be found.
Applying these approaches to governments has its limits, but
the interjection of market concepts of efficiency into the
regulation versus no regulation debate, with the intent that these
170
concepts apply to the government, has changed the discussion.
More often than not, the focus on governmental efficiency is an
attempt to recognize some of a state's shortcomings in the past,
and to try to make amends by achieving its goals in less costly
and less intrusive ways. At the heart of such a response,
however, is a fundamentally status quo ante strategy. A
government that seeks to be more productive and less costly by
making primarily procedural and structural changes is not
necessarily one that is fundamentally changing the substantive
politics of what it is trying to accomplish; the changes are to the
means used to achieve those ends. 17 1 Nor are these approaches

164.

165.
166.

See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supranote 5, at 13.
See JAMEs LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10-12 (1938).
See generally CERNY, THE CHANGING ARCHITECTURE OF POLITICS, supra

note 22, at 227-29.
167. See DICKEN, supranote 32, at 212-23 (discussing the interconnections
of corporations).
168. See id. at 191-212 (analyzing the internal relationships of
transnational corporations).
169. See id. at 215-21 (analyzing subcontracting).
170. Perhaps the ultimate political example of this was President Clinton's
statement in his 1996 State of the Union Address that "the era of big government was
over." President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan.23, 1996), in 32 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 90. The political left had a sharp reaction to this. See David Kusnet,
FeelingHis Way, MOTHER JONES, Feb. 1, 1997, at 46.
171.
See SCHACHTER, supranote 121, at9.
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necessarily intended to be representative of a state that differs in
any significant way from the conception of the nation-state that
has dominated our legal imagination since the New Deal.
At the same time, from the perspective of those who advocate
either a return to a more laissez-faire economy or a more
traditional regulatory state, the very change of the language of
regulation from one steeped in demands and requirements, to one
that emphasizes costs and benefits, provides a discourse that can
have a very definite substantive effect. For example, when public
law values involving long-term judgements regarding the value of
life, the beauty of the environment, or other non-economic issues
are translated into a cost-benefit economic discourse, such
changes are not simply alternative translations, but-like other
kinds of translation-introduce nuances and substantive
changes. 1 72 Economic language itself can have a deregulatory
effect, depending upon how one defines costs and benefits.173
Moreover, from either the point of view of strong state laissez-faire
advocates, or regulators and efficiency-minded governance
advocates, the metaphor of citizen-as-customer has serious
limitations and raises important concerns from whatever state
standpoint one assumes. As we have noted above, the idea of
citizen-as-customer can often encourage a passive view of the
electorate, one that sees citizens as concerned only with very
personal bottom lines, rather than a series of public processes
that lead to those bottom lines, in which their input is sought and
treated as meaningful.
The public law that the efficient state theory encourages is
similar, in some ways, to what some commentators have called

the new public law.' 7 4 The new public law assumes, if not a
strong state, certainly a state with choices. It also assumes the
existence of a state-centered system of politics in which the
choices made are shaped by the politics that produce them.175 Its
emphasis on transformations and the ability of law and politics to
achieve those transformations emphasizes a view of politics that
is or can be effective. Political choices are endogenous to the
system and politics and law are closely linked. 176 Democratic

172.
173.

See generally SAGOFF, supranote 134.
For a discussion of the similarities and the differences between the

cost-benefit approaches in the executive orders issued by the Clinton
Administration and the Reagan-Bush Administration, see Ellen Siegler, Executive
Order 12,866: An Analysis of the New Executive Order on Regulatory Planningand
Review, 24 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,070 (1994).
174. See generally Symposium, The New PublicLaw, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707
(1991).
175. See William Eskridge & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:
ModerationAs A Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 MICH. L. RaV. 707, 749 (1991).

176.

Id.
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theory is also important to this view. It is only by participation in
the political process that political views can form and be
transformative. 1 7 7
Finally, the new public law emphasizes
normativity and substance rather than objective procedural
processes alone, and it stresses the need for interpretivism, a
flexible approach to law that allows decision-makers, especially
courts, to adapt statutory meaning to the continual demands of
78
the present.1
The new public law results, like the reinvention approach
itself, in a pragmatic approach to law and the use of law to
effectuate change. 179
Indeed, much of the deregulation that
occurred, especially in the early days of the Reagan
Administration, was the result of pragmatic public law
interpretations and regulatory choices.' 8 0
When the Reagan
Administration was unable to achieve its more philosophically
based deregulatory goals through Congress, it adopted both a
judicial and an executive agency strategy to achieve its ends. It
imposed, primarily through executive orders, a rigorous, costbenefit approach to federal agency rulemaking that sought to slow
the growth of agency regulation i s i and the Administration
appointed officials to regulatory bodies who interpreted their
statutory powers in ways that encouraged deregulation and other
market approaches.18 2
Indeed, they were able to achieve
substantial deregulation within the very same statutory
frameworks that created the very regulatory structures they
sought to dismantle.' 8 3 For the most part, courts took a very
deferential approach to agency interpretations of their own broad
statutory delegations of power to achieve the public interest,
thereby authorizing those agencies to use market approaches to

achieve their goals.1 8 4 Chevron v. United States was the symbolic
embodiment of this judicial approach. 18 5

177.
178.
179.

Id. at 733-34.
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 749-50.

180. See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 5, at 47-62
(showing how deregulatory economic approaches by agencies were approved by
courts, pursuant to broad public interest statutory language).
181.
Id. at 81-82.
182.
Id. at 1.

183. Deregulation was particularly effective at The Federal Communications
Commission. Id. at 54-59. Overall, however, the size of the bureaucracy
increased during the Reagan Administration. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 7-12 (1992).

184.
Id.
185.
Chevron v. United States, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For an analysis of
Chevron and its relationship to deregulation, see AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A
GLOBAL ERA, supranote 5, at 108-21.
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The laissez-faire philosophical side of the Reagan
deregulatory strategy, however, failed in Congress and in the
courts. With few exceptions, Congress refused to repeal outright
its regulatory statutes or to abolish regulatory agencies.' 8 6 While
the courts were willing to take a deferential approach to agency
interpretations that allowed the market and market approaches to
be used as regulatory tools, the Court resisted constitutional
approaches to issues that would, in effect, repeal substantial
portions of the New Deal.' 8 7 In a series of cases culminating in
Mistretta v. United States,'8 8 the Supreme Court rejected
approaches to separation of power questions that would, in effect,
have put the constitutionality of independent regulatory
commissions very much in doubt.' 8 9 At the same time, the
Court's approach to federalism issues as well as state action and
takings questions remained relatively stable, despite a growing
political debate regarding the appropriate role of the federal
0
government and the courts in a variety of regulatory contexts. 19
The efficient state, however, was more than a reflection of the
The use of market
Reagan Administration's conservatism.
approaches has continued, and forms the cornerstone of many
In many ways it is a
Clinton Administration reforms. 19 1
transition to the globalizing state described below.
3. Mixing Public and Private Power-The Globalizing State
The concept of the globalizing state differs significantly from
the strong and efficient state scenarios discussed above. Those
concepts of the state assume a relatively closed system in which
the power of states, individually and as an international order,
does not significantly change. 19 2 States must now choose new or

186.
187.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 91-103.

188.
189.

488 U.S. 361 (1989).
See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INA GLOBAL ERA, supra note 5, at 102-

03.

190. See Peter Shane, Structure, Relationship, Ideology, or, How Would We
Know a "NewPublicLaw"If We Saw It?, 89 MICH. L. Rrv. 8.37, 844-45 (199 1).
191. For an analysis of why there were far fewer differences between the
regulatory approaches of the Bush and Clinton Administrations, see Aman, A
Global PerspectiveOn CurrentRegulatory Reform, supranote 59.

192.

For an analysis critiquing this closed system approach, see GUEHENNO,

supra note 87, at 49-65:
We are entering into the age of open systems, whether at the level of states
or enterprises, and the criteria of success are diametrically different from
those of the institutional age and its closed systems. The value of an
organization is no longer measured by the equilibrium that it attempts to
establish between its different parts, or by the clarity of its frontiers, but in
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different strategies to deal with the processes of globalization, be
they more market approaches to regulation or more direct
resistance to global forces.
Essentially, however, the focus

remains the same and very much on state institutions.

Any

reforms that might be advocated usually assume that a relatively
bright line still exists between the global and the local or between
domestic and international conceptions of a problem.
The concept of the globalizing state differs in degree and in kind
from these conceptions. It assumes that the line between the global
and the local is blurry at best, and irrelevant in most instances. The
global and the local are facets of a single, dynamic system, not simply
an arrangement of parts and a whole.
Moreover, though
globalization does not, by any means, imply the disappearance of
states, it does imply much more fragmentation of state power than a
state-centered conception of globalization would allow. 193 The fact
that global problems, processes, and economic activities of various
non-state actors do not map onto the territory or jurisdiction of any
one state does not render state power meaningless. Under these
conditions, levels of power are layered by networks of actors and
rules that derive from other states, as well as from the global legal
systems that non-state actors are developing. These bodies of rules
and law as well as economic forces are influential for global actors
but often initially have little to do with the purely state-centered
19 4
approaches to law of any one jurisdiction.
More fundamental is the fact that the globalizing state is a
dynamic concept. The globalizing state itself is a constant work
in progress and the term-globalizing state-is double-edged. It
means that the state itself is an agent of globalization in that it

the number of openings, of points of articulation that it can organize with
everything external to it.

I. at 49.
193. See Cerny, What Next for the State?, supra note 6, at 130. But see
Geoffrey Garrett & Peter Lange, Political Responses to Interdependence: What's
'Left'forthe LeftP, 45 INT'L ORG. 539 (1991).
194. See, e.g., Jeff Gerth, Where Business Rules, Forging Global Regulations
That Put Industry First, N.Y. IMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at D-1 (discussing the global,
informal, harmonized rules suggested for governing worldwide auto safety
standards by industry in United Nations rulemaking proceedings).
In the interest of breaking down trade barriers, negotiations like these are
trying to harmonize or create common regulations for products to be sold
around the world.
At the dawn of this new worldwide regulatory machinery, it is premature
to predict its impact. But corporate executives are generally ecstatic,
consumer advocates are increasingly critical and many regulators from the
United States have mixed feelings.
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furthers certain processes of this emerging new economic order
through, for example, policies designed to attract and retain
investment. It is also in the process of being transformed by the

very processes it seeks to further.

The state, like the

transnational enterprises with which it deals, is affected by and
ultimately changed in fundamental ways by the increased
fragmentation of its powers which now must be shared with other
states and, as we shall see, with non-state actors. A state no
longer has a monopoly on certain areas of law and policy and the
new combinations of public and private power that are emerging
requires a redefinition of what is public and what is private. The
globalizing state thus differs in kind as well as degree from the
states discussed above. As its role shifts to one in which it seeks
primarily to further the kind of competitive environment that
results in greater economic prosperity for those who live within its
borders, it transforms itself.
Changes in approach that
increasingly rely on the private sector to carry out what once were
conceived of as essentially public responsibilities globalize the
state as much as the efficiencies it presumably achieves enable its
constituents to compete more effectively in the global economy.
This double-edged aspect of the globalizing state raises
serious issues with which institutions at all levels-local, state,
national, and international-must grapple. As Professor Cerny
has pointedly argued, fragmentation of state power and the
dilution of democracy are two of the most negative aspects of
globalization:
[G]lobalization entails the undermining of the public character of
public goods and of the specific character of specific assets, i.e.,
the privatization and marketization of economic and political
structures. States are pulled between structural pressures and
organizational levels they cannot control. Economic globalization
contributes not so much to the supercession of the state by a
homogeneous global order as to the splintering of the existing
political order. Indeed, globalization leads to a growing disjunction
between the democratic, constitutional and social aspirations of

people-which are still shaped by and understood through the
frame of the territorial state-on the one hand, and the dissipating
possibilities of genuine and effective collective action through
constitutional political processes on the other. 195

If the globalizing state defines itself exclusively in terms of its
ability to promote efficiency, these negative aspects will be
exacerbated. As Part IV shall argue, however, the concept of the
globalizing state must also involve non-market values such as the
norm of democracy. The norm of democracy involves more than
traditional electoral forms of participation and political

195.

Cerny, What Next for the State?, supranote 6, at 130.
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representation. It involves, more broadly, the concept of
accountability and the various ways in which accountability can
be furthered. At the market level, accountability can be enhanced
by information, and at the state level, by basic administrative law
protections, such as transparency and public participation.
Given the transition now occurring from a national economy
to an integrated global economy, cases that might seem remote
from the forces of globalization take on added significance. There
are innumerable fundamental but hidden issues in seemingly
simple cases involving, for example, the contracting-out of types
of governmental services, that have a profound effect on how we
begin to redefine the public and the private and, in the process,
structure a more fluid, flexible, and democratic governmental
system appropriate for the global era. Indeed, the contracting-out
of governmental services to the private sector 19 6 and extensive
use of market structures and approaches to regulation directly
involve the uses of private power to achieve public ends. They
also involve increasingly common partnerships between the state
and private actors that now provide such local services as
schools, prisons, and snow and garbage removal. 19 7 These new
partnership approaches also involve links between and among
different governmental entities, especially federal and state.
Programs such as welfare now involve new relationships between
and among various levels of government and the private sector as
well. 198
These mixtures of the public and private as well as federal,
state, and local, are representative of more than a collection of
new governmental approaches to achieve common ends in an
efficient manner. They also represent some of the ways in which
the globalizing state now interacts in an economy that knows no
borders. The changes involved are more than political choices to
favor markets over the state or market regulatory approaches over
command and control rules; they are structural as well.
They
are indicative of a de-centered state and they create new demands
and problems that the state-centered public law of the past, even
in its newer, more pragmatic forms, cannot fully meet. First and
foremost among these problems is what might be called the
democracy problem in globalization, which we shall explore more

196.
See generally PATRICK BIRKENSHAW ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY MOONLIGHT
(1990); HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE, supranote 124.

197.
For a discussion of schools, see generally Gary Peller, Public
Imperialism and PrivateResistance: ProgressivePossibilitiesof the New Private Law,
73 DENY. L. REV. 1001 (1996).
198.
See, e.g., The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
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fully below.' 99 Given greater and greater delegations of public
power to the private sector, as well as actors, problems, and
technologies that are not bound by state borders, how can we
institutionally ensure democracy and public participation in
decisions that affect the everyday lives of individuals? A second
issue, also explored below, is flexibility and the need for states
and private entities to maximize the impact of various networks of
relationships that are formed within and beyond state borders.
These questions not only place new issues on lawmakers'
agendas, but they require that decisions made on the basis of
older models of constitutional and public law be viewed in a new
light. Judicial decisions that limit the flexibility of public/private
partnerships, as well as decisions that continue to treat the line
between the public and the private as representative of the strong
state, can do more harm to democratic decision-making than
good.
Moreover, decisions designed to constitutionalize
traditional forms of state autonomy at the expense of federal
power can also substantially undercut the flexibility of
governmental policy makers and reinforce aspects of the strong
state approach to public policy that no longer is in accord with
global realities. Parts III and IV will examine various aspects of
these mixes of public and private power and their implications for
administrative and constitutional law.

IV. THE GLOBALIZING STATE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE
DISTINCTION
Domestic public law has long struggled with issues of
democracy in assessing, for example, the appropriate allocation of
power between courts and legislatures. 20 0
The democracy
problem inherent in globalization, however, is even more
fundamental. It involves more than a debate over which public
institution-the court or the legislature-is best suited to decide
certain kinds of legal issues. What often is at stake when the
globalizing state delegates power to non-state, private, actors is a
choice between some democracy and none at all. While one might
argue that there is, in effect, a democracy problem if unelected
federal judges play too active a role in resolving legal policy
issues, the democracy deficit created by globalization is, thus, of a
different order of magnitude.

199.

See infra text accompanying notes 211-32.

200.
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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Global economic forces, their interaction with essentially
liberal states committed to market economies and the rule of
law,2 0 1 and the structural preferences these forces create for
market solutions to various problems pose a very different
question: when should the exercise of power by the private sector
be viewed as essentially public? Put another way, the question
presented by new forms of market-oriented regulatory reforms is
this: when should citizens view the resort to market forces as a
true preference for the private ordering of the market and when
should the resort to the private sector be viewed as a new mixture
of public/private power, designed by the globalizing state to
achieve its goals as efficiently as possible, but not entirely at the
expense of such public law, non-market values as transparency
and public participation?
Part IV shall explore these questions by analyzing three broad
categories of regulatory reform against the historical backdrop of
the public/private distinction: (1) the wholesale substitution of
the market for state intervention through the legislative process;

(2) the use of the market as a regulatory tool, primarily by
administrative agencies; and (3) judicial supervision of the market
in partnership with the state. We will examine this last category
in some detail because in many ways it is emblematic of the
globalizing state-one that seeks to maintain an effective role in a
world in which it must now increasingly share power not only
with other states, but non-state actors as well.
It is important to emphasize at the outset, however, that
whether we are focusing on the contracting-out of governmental
services to the private sector or the use of the market as a
substitute for regulation or as a regulatory tool, these mixes of
public and private power must be seen as part of a larger global
picture, one that highlights four very significant, simultaneously
ongoing processes. First, the de-centered, globalizing state is not
only reallocating power between the public and private sectors,
but also redefining what is public and what is private. In so
doing, the state is transforming its own role and our conception of
that role. Second, this transformation is occurring within a very
dynamic context-one in which the state increasingly is in intense
competition with other states for jobs and the investment that
creates these positions. This fact places its legal system in
competition with other legal regimes around the world as well.
States with overall lower production costs and more supportive
legal structures may be more successful in retaining current
levels of investment and attracting new capital.

201. See generally Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some
InternationalLegal Theses, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 449 (1997).
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By comparison, the third process, the move from states to
markets, is due to pressure from global actors as well as
regulatory competition and separate jurisdictions trying to
maximize their economic attractiveness vis-a-vis other states.
Many of the global actors within each of these states do business
in multiple jurisdictions and they conceptualize their operations
as essentially borderless. There is, thus, increasing pressure on
states to harmonize regulatory regimes to fit the global realities of
the global entities that are affected by these laws. 2° 2 In short, the
global pressures felt by domestic lawmakers stem not only from
increased regulatory competition between and among separate
nation-states, but from global actors who simultaneously are
located in many of these states and who wish to create legal
systems that can facilitate their ability to carry out their
operations as efficiently as possible. As a result, there are
increasing pressures for various forms of harmonization or deep
203
integration of national economies into the global economy.
Fourth, along with harmonization and deep economic
integration, there is a growing body of global or, in effect,
denationalized law, as well as various international standards

designed to resolve disputes and structure the legal relationships
of entities whose activities cut across a number of
jurisdictions. 2 ° 4 This body of law also can be both in competition
with and a force for harmonizing various domestic law regimes, as
global actors seek to construct legal regimes suitable to their
needs worldwide.
Unlike harmonized national or state legal
structures, however, global law often is developed with little
transparency
and little regard for broad-based
public
20 5
participation.
The pressure for deeper economic integration applied by
various global actors, and the competition individual states
experience from other state and global legal regimes, usually

202. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETz, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME
TAX 271 (1997) ("Because capital, in particular, is extremely mobile across
international boundaries, every nation's sovereignty over its own tax policy is
constrained ....
As nations compete for investments, they tend to reduce their
taxes on capital to make such investments more attractive."); see also supranote
194; see infra notes 237-38.
203. See generallyESTY, GREENING THE GATT 108-11 (1994).
204. See, e.g., supra note 1 (dealing with lex mercatoria); see also Daniel C.
Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization:
Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
265, 285 (1997). Global law is developed outside the framework of any one state
and largely outside the framework of states at all. See G. TEUBNER, supranote 1.
205. See, e.g., Lewis Rosman, Public Participationin InternationalPesticide
Regulation: When the Codes Commission Decides, Who Will Listen?, 12 VA. ENVTL.
L. J. 329 (1993).

THE GLOBALIZING STATE

1998]

result in the creation of more economic approaches to regulatory
issues and governmental tasks. Such approaches to governance
emphasize flexibility, efficiency, and cost, all of which are very
much a part of achieving success in the global economy. They are
not, however, simply the result of new functional regulatory
approaches employed by the same state that brought us the New
Deal or nineteenth century laissez-faire. The participants in state
lawmaking processes, the demands for law that they make, the
various state responses made to these demands, and, even more
importantly, the structural changes the state itself undertakes to
increase its own efficiency and competitiveness, are changing the
nature not only of the law involved, but of the state itself.20 6 As
the state itself both emulates and co-opts the market to achieve
its goals, these various transformations raise important issues
concerning what is now public and private that differ significantly
from an earlier time when such categories had a very different
meaning.2 0 7
They also necessitate
broader ways of
conceptualizing democracy beyond traditional concepts of political
representation. This is because the resort to markets alone
cannot necessarily always be viewed as the end of a sense of
community involvement or interest.
A. The Public/PrivateDistinctionand Three Types
of Regulatory Reform
The public/private distinction once demarcated two relatively
separate worlds-government and the private market.20 8 Private
capital markets tended to be primarily local, and capital had little
mobility. 20 9 Private in this sense, however, has long passed into
history. Moreover, deregulation and the various other regulatory
reforms we have earlier called the efficient state have merged the
public and the private in various ways, utilizing what previously
were primarily private market approaches, techniques, and

206.
See infra text accompanying notes 161-99.
207.
Various mixtures of public and private power, and the constitutional
problems some of them can cause, of course, long predate the rise of the global
state. See, e.g., Note, Lawmaking By Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
More recently, commentators have discussed a variety of potential constitutional
problems that could arise when lawmadng power is delegated to private groups.
See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private
Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONSTL. L. Q. 165 (1989);
Herold J. Krent, Fragmenting The Unitary Executive: CongressionalDelegations of
Administrative Authority Outside The Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62
(1990); David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J.
647 (1986).
208.

See SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL, supranote 7.

209.

Id.
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structures to advance public interest goals.2 10 Given the dynamic
aspects of the globalizing state, and the fact that the state is an
agent transformed by the processes of globalization, it is
important to understand fully the global implications of these
various deregulatory reforms at the legislative, administrative
agency, and judicial levels. The following sections examine three
contexts in which globalization affects the mixtures of public and
private power that result, the ways in which our institutions
respond to these forces, and how best we should conceptualize
those responses in light of the globalizing forces involved.
1. The Market as a Complete Substitute for RegulationLegislative Change
The globalizing state introduces additional factors into
traditional notions of the public/private distinction, even
recognizing that public and private are now often blurred or
merged. What constitutes many of the private interests and the
private sector generally is itself now global in its orientation and
goals. The globalization of the private sector has profound
influences on public, domestic, and international lawmaking
processes. Given the pluralistic nature of our lawmaking
processes, these changes encourage harmonization, if not
deregulation or privatization of these very processes. In the first
instance, the infusion of such global, market forces is facilitated
by public-oriented, participatory processes that give the private,
globalized sector very definite roles to play in the lawmaking
processes. This, of course, begins at the legislative stage,
when
21 1
Congress considers new legislation on various issues.
The purest kind of deregulation is that which removes
governmental regulation where it once existed, with no strings
attached.2 12 For example, during the Carter Administration,
when the head of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Alfred Kahn,

See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supranote 5, at 42-62.
211.
See, e.g., Congressional testimony in support of fast track authority by
Robert W. Holleyman, Testimony to Congress, President of Business Software
Alliance (1995 WL 293530 (F.D.C.H.), May 11, 1995); Marc Curtis, American
Soybean Association, (1997 WL 592041 (F.D.C.H.), Sept. 23, 1997). See also The
Republican Contract with America, 104th Congress, which "would temporarily
suspend most new regulations; subject proposed rules on health, safety and
environmental protection to elaborate scientific reviews; override the health
considerations in existing laws with economic calculations of regulatory costs and
benefits, [and] compensate private landowners when regulations reduce their
property values." House Oks Anti-Regulation Package, THE CHATTANOOGA TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1995, at A5.
212. It is assumed, however, that the antitrust laws still apply when, for
example, pricing regulations are removed.
210.
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declared that airplanes were, essentially, marginal costs with
wings, 2 13 it was because he believed that the airline industry was
an essentially competitive one and price regulation was not
necessary. The Administration advocated deregulation of various
aspects of this industry as well as the abolition of the CAB
itself.2 14 Congress agreed, and it passed the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978.215 Similarly, when President Reagan took office in
1981, one of his first official acts was to deregulate completely the
price of oil at the wellhead,2 16 a process which had begun
2 17
pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act.

Oil

producers were subject to the discipline of a competitive market
and there was simply no need for governmental intervention. The
same reasoning applied to the trucking industry which led to its
deregulation and, ultimately, to the Clinton Administration's
support for Congress' abolition of the Interstate Commerce
J
8
Commission.2 1
In all of these examples, the deregulation involved was
relatively pure-Congress removed completely certain aspects of
the regulatory structure because it was assumed that a free
market existed and that that market would protect consumers
from unfair pricing. The line between the public and the private
could thus be seen as a bright one, with deregulation indicating a
clear preference for the private ordering of market forces.
Those who adhered to a strong state laissez-faire philosophy

greeted these reforms with enthusiasm.

At the same time,

advocates of a strong regulatory state also rationalized these
decisions. The theory of airline deregulation was that it would
actually lower prices for consumers and abolish the role of an
administrative agency that had, in effect, been captured by the

213.
See Elizabeth Bailey & Dong Liu, Airline Consolidation and Consumer
Welfare, 21 E. ECON. J. 463 (1995):
While it was recognized that regional carriers had a higher cost structure
than national carriers, it was thought that this would be eliminated by

permitting free entry and exit. As Alfred Kahn once expressed it, airplanes
are "marginal costs with wings" that can readily be deployed in newly
opened markets.
Id.
214.

MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J.

QUIRK, BROOKINGS INST., THE POLITICS OF

DEREGULATION 111-12 (1985).
215. Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.

216. Exec. Order No. 12, 207, 3 C.F.R. 124 (1981), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. §
757 (1982).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 753(a) (1976).
218. See Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995).

822

VARDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:769

very industry it sought to regulate. 2 19 The same can be said of
trucking deregulation and the abolition of the ICC. 2 20 Oil pricing
deregulation also occurred at a point when oil prices were coming
down and competition could be trusted to create affordable
221
sources of energy for consumers of average means.
In this sense, these deregulatory decisions were in accord
with the theory of the efficient state as well. A large, costly
bureaucracy was not necessary to yield the lower prices the
market could now provide. This was another example where the
government could accomplish its end results with less cost to
society.
Both the strong and efficient state rationales, however,
depend on a state-centered form of analysis. They assume that
the state can make such decisions largely on its own and that the
decision to resort to the market is completely voluntary. They
also assume that there is a clear divide between the public and
the private. In the case of price controls on airlines, trucking, or
oil, it was best for philosophical and practical political reasons to
return these activities to the rigors of the marketplace.
Viewing these changes through the prism of the globalizing
state does not require disagreement with the results reached in
these examples, but it does require a different analysis. First, by

eschewing any bright line distinctions between the public and the
private, this concept of the state starts from the premise that
what is involved is not so much the release of but the delegation
of power to the private sector. Is this a voluntary delegation,
based on a sense that better policy results will be achieved, or is
this imposed by the structural requirements of globally
competitive private actors? The end result of the legislation
involved may be a more efficient government or a more
deregulated economy, but does this contribute to a "race to the
bottom" in any of the issues involved? To what extent should a
public component remain a part of these deregulated activities,
beyond the threat to enforce the antitrust laws if the markets do
not function as planned?
These questions do not necessarily require a different result,
particularly when such pricing decisions, as described above, are
involved; but they start from different premises so far as the role
of the state is concerned. By asking whether these decisions are
voluntary or imposed by the competitive global structure

219. See, e.g., Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation v.
Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871 (1973).
220. In fact, the deregulation imposed by the agency itself ultimately led to
a "deregulation" bill that sought to regulate this area. See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supranote 5, at Introduction n. 13.
221.
Id.
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described above, such an analysis requires a sense of the overall
global context in which the deregulation occurs. Closely related
to this line of questioning is whether or not the deregulatory
action involved makes it easier or harder to help create or link-up
with emerging international approaches to certain kinds of
problems and issues. In other words, is this a decision with
global consequences, and if so how does it mesh with the global
economic and legal regimes? How much coordination among
states is required for these deregulated markets to work?
These kinds of questions are not usually the ones that
legislators ask. The more comprehensive the legislative change
proposed, the broader the political spectrum involved, and the
more domestic the discourse is likely to be. It is necessary to
translate the global forces at work into a local, domestic political

discourse to form the kinds of political coalitions necessary to
motivate a majority of 535 legislators to take action. 22 2 The
deregulatory reforms of the Carter, Reagan, Bush, and even
Clinton administrations, were effectively "sold," almost as if they
were a form of consumer legislation. Indeed, whether it was
airline prices in the 1970s, oil prices in the 1980s, or trucking
prices in the 1990s, the promise of these deregulatory reforms
was lower prices for consumers.
It would be a mistake, however, not to examine these
examples of deregulatory changes from a broader, global
perspective.
Certainly airlines, and energy in particular, are
irrevocably tied up with the global economy and with industries
that do business and compete worldwide.
The New Deal,
national-based, zero-sum domestic political forms of regulation
cannot easily or sensibly be applied to such industries. As long
as competitive markets were in place, it was not necessary to
protect consumers in their role as consumers of these products
and services.

222.

See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 320 (1982):

The Ford administration first unveiled support of airline deregulation at

the Kennedy hearings which, in turn, were designed to depict regulatory
reform as an effort to help the consumer and to lessen burdensome
regulatory bureaucracy. If the issue is seen as one of "lower prices,"
"helping the consumer," or "freeing business from the 'dead hand of
regulation," it can pick up support, time, and effort from many persons
who will not interest themselves in "higher airline profits," "more efficient
use of aircraft," or "more efficient or effective airline regulatory programs."
Thus, political support is, in part, a function of how one sees the issuehow it has been characterized-and that is a matter that is partly, but not
wholly, within the control of those who are seeking to bring about reform.
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These particular examples of wholesale market reform
represent a relatively pure form of privatization and they also
avoid the democracy problems usually associated with
globalization. 2 23 The fundamental decision to deregulate at the
legislative level was the subject of democratic debate and
legislation. The return of these pricing functions to the private
sector was accompanied by a legislative understanding that not
only were there competitive markets involved, but that the results
of those markets would be favorable to consumers.
Quite apart from outcome, however, which is relevant to the
political viability of the legislative change at a particular point in
time, it is the expectation of a "real" market at work that is
important from an analytical point of view.
The fact that
consumers have real choices, and that competition sets the prices
involved, means that a kind of consumer democracy or
sovereignty can exist. The threat to vote with one's feet or with

one's dollars is a real one. The privatization that results does not,
therefore, take power away from citizens, nor does it delegate it to
the kinds of private entities that resemble the monopolistic power
of states. There is, thus, a kind of regulatory discipline that a
well-functioning market can provide.
Citizens or consumers,
however, require information for this to occur. Beyond the kind
of information that can enable an individual consumer to make a
rational choice in a domestic market, there also is information
that can have more of a collective, political effect. For example,
publicity concerning the corporate practices of global firms that
pay exceedingly low wages or make extensive use of child labor

223.
Similarly, the recent massive deregulatory act involving the
telecommunications industry is also the result of comprehensive Congressional
reform. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)). See generally
Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251,252 (1996).
[The Telecommunications Act of 1996] represents a vision of a
telecommunications marketplace where the flexibility and innovation of
competition replaces the heavy hand of regulation. It is based on the
premise that technological changes will permit a flourishing of
telecommunications carriers, engaged in head-to-head competition,
resulting in a multitude of communications carriers and programmers
being made available to the American consumer.

Id. Creation of the markets necessary for this Act to work has been a major task
facing the Federal Communications Commission. See, e.g., Charles M. Oliver,
The Information Superhighway: Trolls at the Tollgate, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 53, 61

(1997) ("[Tihe core of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is a quid pro quo: the
RBOCs [Regional Bell Operating Companies] will be allowed to get into the long
distance and manufacturing businesses, in return for which they must open their
markets to local competition.").
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can lead to global consumer boycotts of these products. 2 2 4 In
these instances, the market and the consumer sovereignty it
creates helps provide an informal, global sanction aimed at
curbing practices that individual states have either been unable
or unwilling to correct. In effect, the market becomes a kind of
legislature at the global level, quite apart from any actions by
22 S
states or local legislatures.
Democracy as accountability, enforced through consumer
boycotts of this kind, represents a necessary form of global reprise
when more traditional legal approaches may not be effective. Of
course, states can try to facilitate the use of the market in this
way through disclosure laws and the dissemination of this
information. 2 2 6 An important aspect of the globalizing state is the

224.

For example, when reports surfaced that Reebok was purchasing

soccer balls stitched by children, the company responded by creating a
centralized production facility and establishing independent monitors.
After
Starbucks Coffee was picketed by activists concerned with its Guatemalan
plantations, the firm issued a revised code of conduct and specific action plans
for dealing with abuses. Also bowing to public pressure after high profile
consumer protests, The Gap committed itself to third-party monitoring by signing
an agreement with the National Labor Committee. See Debora L. Spar, The
Spotlight on the Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export Human Rights, 77(2)
FOREIGN AFF. 7, 9 (1998). In response to pressure over labor issues, U.S.-based
transnational corporations have created codes of conduct that address workers'
rights. A Reebok spokesman has stated that "[c]onsumers today hold companies
accountable for the way products are made, not just the quality of the product
itself." Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchiiffe-Darricsrrere, Enforcing International
LaborRights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663
(1995); see also Gerard Aziakou, US Nike, Agence France Presse, Apr. 10, 1998,
Advisory Section (reporting that labor rights groups are planning a worldwide day
of protest on Apr. 18, 1998, to highlight Nike's workers' rights violations at its
overseas facilities); Jeff Manning, Nike Battles Back, But Activists Hold the High
Ground, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 WL 13136566 (reporting that
New Jersey schoolchildren staged an anti-Nike play on Broadway, and that a
1996 consumer survey listed "bad labor practices" as the third most applicable
phrase describing Nike); Rosalind Rossi, Poshard Joins Protest at Nike Store,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, April 9, 1998, at 10 (reporting that 75 demonstrators
protested outside Nike's Michigan Avenue store concerning Nike's treatment of its
foreign workers). Following media revelations of forced labor in China and child
labor in Southeast Asia, major retailers and apparel and footwear manufacturers
adopted policies and codes of conduct concerning forced labor, child labor, and
worker health and safety. Firms with such codes and policies include: Levi
Strauss, Sears, J.C. Penney, Wal-Mart, The Gap, Starbucks, Timberland, Nike,
and Reebok. Some firms, including Levi Strauss and Timberland, have gone so
far as to pull out of entire countries where there are pervasive human rights
violations. See Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights
RevolutionP, 19 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1963, 1973 (1996).
225.
Id.
226.
See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich & Patricia A. Davidson, Local and State
Regulation of Tobacco: The Effects of the Proposed National Settlement, 35 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 87, 103-04 (1998):
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creation and dissemination of information that allows the
democracy of the market to work.
Given the reliance the
globalizing state places on the market and market processes,
providing information that encourages this kind of consumer
sovereignty may enhance a new form of democratic action and
create the kind of accountability that democracy requires.
Quite apart from such substantive deregulatory reforms,
other recent deregulatory reforms at the legislative level deal
explicitly with the global economy and focus as much on the
process of legislative change as on its substance.
For example,
the recent legislative proposal involving fast-track legislation for
trade bills seeks to enhance the President's position and to limit
the legislature's role in the process of considering trade legislation
by limiting the power to amend the legislation involved on the
floor of the House or Senate. 2 27
For certain kinds of trade

legislation, there must be an up or down vote.
democratic

approaches

above, proposals

to

to

deregulatory

deregulate

Unlike the

legislation

the legislative

described

process

raise

concerns regarding the norm of democracy, concerns which must
be balanced with the nature of the issues involved and the extent
to

which

meaningful

public

participation

can

and

should

occur. 22 8 In this respect, the treaty process may be considered to

Essentially, the new federal system would require manufacturers to
supply the FDA with a list of ingredients, other than tobacco or water,
"which are added by the manufacturer to the tobacco, paper or filter of the
tobacco product by brand and by quantity in each brand." For each such
ingredient, the manufacturer would have to indicate whether it believes
the ingredient is exempt from public disclosure under the legislation.
Under the Proposed Settlement, manufacturers would have to "disclose
ingredient information to the public under regulations comparable to what
current federal law requires for food products, reflecting the intended
conditions of use."
Id.; see also Robert F. Blomquist, Models and Metaphors for Encouraging
Responsible PrivateManagement of Transboundary Toxic Substances Risk Toward
A Theory of Incentive-Based Environmental Experimentation, 18 U. PA. INT'L EcON.
L. 507, 558-59, n. 109 (1997) ("Information reporting is an incentive-based
environmental tool whereby the government 'requires firms to provide specified
types of information, either to a government agency or to the public directly.').
227.
See Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the CongressionalFast Track- From
Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 687 (1996).
228.
See, e.g., Testimony of Hon. Dana Rohrabacher, Penniesfor Thoughts:
How GATT Fast Track Harms American PatentApplicants, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL

COMMENT 491 (1996) (arguing that in an effort to harmonize U.S. patent law with
international laws, the U.S. Patent Office traded away critical patent protection
American inventors had come to expect); see also Patti Goldman, The
Democratizationof the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 631, 650-97 (1994) (proposing revision of the fast-track process to allow
social values and consumer concerns to be considered when trade agreements
are proposed). Many commentators argue that fast-track does provide ample
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be the outer edges of a deregulated legislative process tailored to
produce globally influenced legislation. The nature of this process
is that a treaty can be ratified with a two-thirds vote of the Senate
alone. Executive treaties, of course, do not even require the

Senate.
There may be a strong tendency for democratic processes 22to9
diminish in proportion to the global, economic interests involved.
The nature of the legislative process is primarily domestic and the

desire for some global players to bypass the legislative process
altogether is driven not only by their own policy goals, but by the
fact that such entities often are doing business in multiple
jurisdictions and can more easily work out private, transnational
arrangements to facilitate their business transactions.
Global
law--essentially denationalized approaches to global issues-is
their preferred solution. 2 30 But this is not always possible. Nor is
complete privatization possible, particularly when the issues
involved are not-like pricing or trade-primarily economic but
involve externalities and spillovers of various kinds.2 3 1 Just as
administrative agencies initially were more successful in
23 2
deregulating their respective areas of the law than Congress was,

opportunities to debate and deliberate fully. The President is required to notify
Congress of his intent to enter into a trade agreement and has 90 days from that
date to consult with Congress on the terms of the agreement. 19 U.S.C.S. §
2902(c)-(d) (1998). Because amendments are not permitted under the fast-track
process, this consultation period serves as an opportunity for the Executive and
Legislative Branches to discuss the issues and make changes to the proposal
before the final vote. For a detailed description of this process, see Janet A.
Nuzum, Comments on the Fast-Track Process for Congressional Consideration of
NAFTA, 1 U.S. MEXIcO L.J. 339 (1993). In addition, Congress has the power to
choose to "derail' fast-track and follow the usual approach of Congressional
deliberations. See Carrier, supranote 227; 19 U.S.C.S. § 2903(c).

229.

The number of executive treaties has risen in recent years. See L.K.

JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 13 (1986). For a discussion
of the relationship of such executive action to the legislative process, see AMAN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INAGLOBAL ERA, supranote 5, at 132.
230.
See, e.g., supra note 1; see also James C. Allen, Fed to Test SelfRegulationIdeafor Setting Derivatives Capita4 AMERICAN BANKER, April 18, 1996, at
24 ("The so-called precommitment-of-capital
approach to trading risk
management is not expected to immediately replace internationally accepted
regulations. But bankers are hopeful the test will show banking regulators the
benefits of self-regulation."); Self-Regulatory ParadigmBanks Preppingfor Test, 6
AMERICAN BANKER-BOND BUYER No. 19, 1 (1996) ("Seven major banks are
considering participating in a trial run of a self-regulatory market risk capital
approach proposed by the Federal Reserve. The concept eventually could be
applied to all banks, saving them resources now devoted to complying with
regulations.").
231.
See generally JUTrA BRUNN8E, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REGULATION 112-21 (1988).
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they also are likely to be more responsive to the globalization
processes as well. Agencies are less visible to the public. They

often deal with highly technical issues that are not easily
politicized, and they can engage in a focused, substantive dialogue
through the administrative process with those entities and interests
most likely to be affected by them. The fact that administrative
agencies will increasingly resort to market tools and market
discourse is the result of the kind of synthesis that goes on as
agencies seek not just to be appropriately responsive to the
interests with which they deal, but effective as well.
2. The Market as a Regulatory Tool
Legislative deregulation or privatization is to be distinguished
from the use of market incentives and market regulatory
approaches as a substitute for so-called command and control
regulation. Perhaps the most extensive U.S. example of this
approach is the use of market regulation by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).23 3
Rather than trying to mandate
precisely how certain industries might lower their pollution levels,
the EPA seeks to provide market incentives to achieve such goals.
For example, a market for pollution reduction might be created by
selling pollution permits. Those industries capable of lowering
their pollution below mandated levels can receive compensation
from those companies unable to meet their goal. 2 3 4 Using the
market in this way is a form of deregulation in that it provides
more compliance alternatives to the regulated entities, and more
flexibility for regulated entities in determining how best to achieve
their goals. Such approaches usually are less costly to implement
and enforce.

232.

See, e.g., AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 5, at

Chs. 1-2 (reviewing the decisions of the FCC and ICC and the manner in which
courts allowed these changes to occur).
233.
See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341 (1985):
Our basic reform would respond to these deficiencies by allowing polluters
to buy and sell each other's permits-thereby creating a powerful financial
incentive for those who can clean up most cheaply to sell their permits to
those whose treatment costs are highest. This reform will, at one stroke,
cure many of the basic flaws of the existing command-and-control
regulatory systems discussed earlier.
Id.; see also Marshall J. Breger et al., Providing Economic Inventives In
EnvironmentalRegulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463, 468-69 (1991) ("I am persuaded
that the endless proliferation of command-and-control regulations is not, in
general, a workable or appropriate long-run way of dealing with this problem.").
234.
Id.
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As we have seen in Part III, such approaches meet very well
with concepts of the efficient state. 23 5 Despite the market-based
nature of these rules and programs, however, such regulatory
regimes are the products of Administrative Procedure Act
processes, and are thus subject to standard public law procedural
requirements-notice, public participation, and a clear statement
of the basis and purpose of the rules.2 3 6 Yet, it is this very
openness to the viewpoints and arguments of global participants
that helps to globalize the rulemaking processes that promulgate
these rules. It is one way in which domestic processes help to
democratize and, in effect, re-nationalize various global processes,
thereby
furthering
economic
integration
and
regulatory
harmonization.
For those who see much or most of the globe as a potential
marketplace, more is at stake in such lawmaking processes
especially if they are experiencing competition from firms that
play by different rules in other jurisdictions. These pressures
may not only yield more intense advocacy of low-cost regulatory
approaches that might give them a competitive edge, but also, at
a minimum, a desire to standardize or harmonize the regulation
23 7
that ultimately affects them.
As Part II has shown, the essence of globalization is that it
involves cultural, economic, and social processes that usually
have little direct impact on any one particular state.
The
processes of globalization are denationalized processes. This fact
does not mean that domestic law will not apply to some aspects of
these processes, but rather that the law that does emerge
includes and is affected by these denationalizing forces. Thus, for

235.
236.

See supratext accompanying notes 161-91.
See Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553, 556,

557 (1994).
237.
See, e.g., Christopher L. Bell, Bench Test, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM,
Nov./Dec. 1997, at 24, 24-26, 28-29, 32-34 (describing the International
Organization Standardization's environmental management standard, "ISO
14001," a voluntary standard, devised privately, that is meant to provide uniform
approaches to environmental management for companies operating around the
world). See also Gerth, supranote 194, discussing global auto safety rules and
noting:
The final automotive standards agreement is expected by March [1998]
but few consumer advocates will have had a say. There were 62

government regulators and 26 industry representatives who took part in
the Geneva auto committee last November, under United Nations rules,
but only one consumer representative from London and one auto club
member from France.
See generally Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental
Organizationsin InternationalDedsion-Making Institutions, WASH. Q., Winter 1995,

Id.

at 45.
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example, when certain private groups propose or support certain
types of environmental or safety regulation, they often seek to
encourage adoption of approaches that, to a large extent, further
their harmonization goals. In an important sense, the political,
domestic rulemaking processes in which such actors participate
serve, in effect, as a means of re-nationalizing a set of rules driven
by global as opposed to solely national concerns. The end result
may be the provision of a U.S. regulatory stamp to a set of rules
that are more global in their outlook and creation than they are
local or national. This process furthers a kind of deep integration
of the national economy with the global economy. The marketoriented rules that often result need not be exactly like those in
other jurisdictions but they are likely to be reasonably compatible
with other legal systems, making it easier for transnational nonstate actors to carry out their operations more efficiently as well
as for states to retain and to compete more effectively for their
2 38

business.

This relationship between the ways public lawmaking
processes can incorporate and translate private, global
perspectives and interests into binding rules is paralleled, to some
extent, by the relationship between such processes of deep
integration and democracy. To the extent that integration occurs
essentially outside of national or state legal structures with, for
example, the development of a global system of rules that
facilitates the goals of transnational actors, such rules are less
likely to have anything to do with a state's democratic processes.
Though global law can develop in the shadow of the state, it is
usually a private creation, controlled by the needs of the nonstate actors. Integration that occurs as a result of national legal
regimes harmonizing their own regulatory structures in
competition with other states and denationalized global regimes
has the advantage of at least making some of the issues involved
public and subject to such public processes as the rulemaking
procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act and other
regulatory statutes.
The private and denationalized legal
preferences of global actors are re-nationalized when they are
adopted in whole or in part pursuant to national regulatory
2 39
proceedings, and democratized as well.

238. For an excellent, thorough analysis of harmonization in the
environmental area, see Esty & Geradin, supranote 204.
239. For example, to the extent that ISO 14000 rules ever become a part of

APA rulemaking or to the extent that they begin to influence both the approaches
of the state to environmental issues and the actual outcome of domestic
rulemaking proceedings, such proceedings would then nationalize the
denationalized approaches and standards developed by these global
actors. while it may be contended that such public participation comes too late
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What are the implications of such rulemaking processes for
the globalized state? First and foremost, it is important that the
state maintain a public role in the integrative processes now
underway. To the extent that the state is sidestepped or rendered
irrelevant by global forces, a broad-based public voice will be
eliminated from the policymaking process. More importantly, the
law now developing necessarily takes as its goals flexibility,
efficiency, and a stronger orientation towards the market. These
goals should not be viewed as the result of capture by global
corporate interests, but rather the beginnings of new, more
flexible, and experimental legal regimes. Indeed, such regimes are
necessary for maintaining the public's voice in what could

otherwise become a wholly privatized world.
Given the de-centering of the state that has occurred, the
globalizing state has had to adapt to the realities of global
competition by recognizing not only its limits, but the creative
opportunities that exist to construct new global approaches to
issues with various non-state actors at all levels of government
and enterprise. If the invocation and use of the market is seen
only in state-centric terms, the debate over globalization that
ensues is likely to be the familiar contest between pro- and antigovernment or pro- and anti-market advocates that has
dominated policy and politics to date. As this Article argues,
however, it is necessary to go beyond conceptions of the market
and the state that depend upon bright line distinctions between
the public and the private. It also requires that we understand
that simply the use of one discourse or the other does not
necessarily, for legal and constitutional purposes, render some
activity either public or private. In many ways, the following
examples of public/private mixtures of power are emblematic of
the global era and of our need to understand clearly how much is
at stake as we begin to redefine what we mean by public and
private.
3. The Market In Partnership with the State-Contracting-Out
Public Services
Quite apart from the substitution of markets for states and
the use of markets by administrative agencies, a third category of
regulatory reform combines aspects of both of these reforms, yet

to be maximally effective, it is important to create channels for public input as a
first step towards shaping the emerging legal structure in a useful way.
For a discussion of ISO 14000 and how its standards are developed and how
they influence behavior, see Christina C. Benson, The ISO 14000 International
Standards:Moving Beyond Environmental Compliance, 22 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG.
307 (1996). See also supranote 237.

832

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:769

is nonetheless distinct. The state may not be relieved of the
responsibility of accomplishing certain tasks, but it need not do
all of them itself. Contracting-out or outsourcing to the private
sector tasks once performed by government turns such tasks as
snow removal, garbage collection, and the management of prisons
over to the market, but this is not the relatively pure legislative
deregulation described in the first set of examples. The tasks,
though performed by private companies, clearly remain public
responsibilities, and as we shall see, the market is often more of a
metaphor than a reality. On the other hand, like the examples in
Section Two above, using the private sector in this way enables
the state to take advantage of the efficiencies of the market. The
performance of these public functions by private entities,
however, is not usually accompanied by any of the traditional
administrative procedures involved in formulating the marketoriented rules described in section two above. Rather, the
language of the market is often substituted for that of
administrative law. Citizens are viewed as if they were only
consumers of these public services, and not expected to be
involved in deciding how services should be provided. Such an
approach may increase the efficiency of the private company
engaged in the service at issue, but it is likely to do so at the
expense of fundamental public law values, as I shall now explain.
Contracts involving public services are more complex than
contracts between two individuals participating in a market
economy. 2 4° A distinction must be drawn between customers and
consumers.2 4 1 For example, when a city enters into a contract
with the provider of a streetcleaning service, the customer is the
city, but the consumers are those who live on and use city
streets. The decision to provide this service is a public one and
the price charged-through user fees or taxes-is not necessarily
2 42
the market price from a consumer sovereignty point of view.
The amount charged may deviate from the market price. In other
words, this is not the kind of market transaction that results
when the consumers of a product are also the primary customers.
Thus, opting for the private sector as a politically preferred
alternative to government, coupled with a politics that substitutes
the results and processes of a private ordering system for those of
a public law approach, may make what is in fact a public
decision, appear to be private. Indeed, one of the most important
tasks courts have in resolving disputes that flow from how these

m.C.

240.

See supraPart

241.

See HINDY LAUER SCHACHTER, supra note 121, at 10-11.

242.

Id. at 11-12.
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public/private arrangements are perceived, is to determine how
best to conceptualize these mixtures of public and private power.
The limits of the market metaphor are even more apparent
when applied to privatized prisons.
Private prisons differ
significantly from public services contracts for street cleaning or
snow removal. The customers in the private prison context are
the state or federal agencies that seek to hire private prison
service providers. The consumers of the product are, in effect, the
prisoners themselves. If anything, citizens are more akin to third
party beneficiaries of this contract, not its consumers. Thus, this
kind of service is not marketable in any usual sense of that term.
Certainly the consumers involved are not willing buyers of the
service provided. And, of course, the demand for the product
itself is set by the state's own criminal laws and its ability to
enforce them.
Thus, the idea of private prisons differs
substantially from other public services in which the citizens are
the direct consumers, some of whom may be willing to pay
additional or variable amounts for more of the services provided,
as is true when, for example, private security forces or gated
24
communities are involved. 3
The kind of rhetoric that might apply in other contexts
involving contractual approaches to public services is thus not
applicable here.
This is not a case of increasing individual
autonomy and freedom. In the prison context, outsourcing is
primarily an attempt by the state to lower its costs and to operate
prisons more efficiently by encouraging competition among prison
providers. 24 4 Indeed, some states, in their search for the lowest
cost providers of the service, have even explored the possibilities
of "off-shore prisons."2 45 Arizona, for example, has considered
using Mexico as a site for the construction and administration of
246
new prison facilities necessary to house some of its prisoners.

It would seem that, under such circumstances, the contract
between the state and the private provider involved would
mandate an extension of state power into what would otherwise
be a state-run facility. Yet, as we shall see, there are reasons to
resist either/or thinking in this context, even though the
privatized prison would seem to be an obvious extension of the

243.
See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73
DENy. U. L. REV. 1185 (1995-1996) (discussing the complexities, risks, and
considerations involved in opting out of public provision).
244.
See generally RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY (1997) (stating that public accountability is crucial in private
prisons not only to maintain standards but improve the penal system).
245.
Gaff Hulden, New Focus: Texas Welfare, Arizona Prisons, Elsewhere,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 22, 1997, at A20, availablein 1997 WL 4175377.
246.
Id.
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More importantly, the privatization movement vis-A-vis

prisons also can be motivated by factors beyond costs. To the
extent that the private sector is viewed as being tougher and more
efficient than the state, and the rights of prisoners are considered
increasingly lower in importance as far as the general public is

concerned, the reforms the private sector may bring to bear are
popular, both economically and politically. The idea that the
market is unforgiving in certain ways may reinforce the politics of
retribution when it comes to prison reform. 2 4 7 Such reasoning,
however, should be limited by any constitutional protections
prisoners may have, and it is another way in which courts can
and should play an important role when it comes to conforming
the rhetoric of the market with the realities of the public/private
mix of powers created.
Much is at stake when courts review the public/private blend
of power that certain forms of privatization produce. There are
limits to the extent that judicial decisions can further global
public law principles without legislative and executive leadership,
but there also are limits to the extent to which some of the more
ideological aspects of global competition can and should
determine the blend of public and private that such relatively new
regulatory reforms reveal.
A basic framework emerges involving the contracting-out of
public services, a framework that can help courts ask and resolve
three very important questions.
First, where do market
approaches end and the market metaphors begin? By this we
mean that some privately provided services may genuinely be
marketable-i.e., contracted for by the actual consumers of the
services and paid for at the market price, such as private security
forces.2 48 Most outsourced public services are not this pure.
Though they may be paid for by taxes or user fees, the amount
involved is not the same as the market price.2 4 9 Closely related to
this fact is the identity of the actual customer involved. When a
city, state, or federal entity contracts for a service, it is, in fact,
the customer, and not necessarily the consumer of the services,
who is involved. This raises a second question: are the citizens
involved customers or consumers or, simply interested parties in
the way that all citizens are when governmental policies are
involved? The answer to these questions help to further our
understanding
of this question:
what
common
stake
citizens/consumers have in the services being provided, and,
implicitly, what role they should or can play in determining such

247.
248.
249.

See HARDING, supranote 244.
See generally Gillette, supranote 243.
HARDEN, supranote 124, at 7-8.
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questions as to whom, how, and when these services might be
provided?
It is at this point in the analysis that important questions of
democracy may surface, albeit in ways that can conflict with some of
the economic goals of the privatized services involved. In the short
run, democracy and public participation will usually increase the
costs of decision-making. This may, in turn, cut deeply into the
global currency that a purely privatized approach may create.
Nevertheless, the more decision-makers opt for such distinctions as
administration and policymaking or private and public, the more the
global economy can undermine democracy. A fundamental tenet of
outsourcing, for example, is that a clear demarcation exist between
the policy to delegate certain duties to a private company and the
administration of those duties by the company involved. By ensuring
that the responsibility for prison administration rests completely with
a private provider, the contracting agent is free to assess provider
performance. The public input in this process usually is involved
only at the renewability stage of the contract. The assumption is that
a kind of outcome-based analysis can be used to determine whether
these contracts should be renewed or not.25 0 The more bottom-line
oriented the review, the greater the incentives on the part of the
company to perform efficiently, but the less on-going public input
25 1
and involvement there is.
Policy questions and administration can never fully be
separated, even in what might seem to be relatively
straightforward tasks such as garbage collection or snow
removal. 25 2 Whose garbage or snow is removed first? Who has
priority in emergencies? It may be that some of these issues can
be resolved in the contracts that are negotiated, with those

250.

Aronson, supranote 125, at 62.

251.
Id.
252. Id. at 56-58. But see The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (a current tax
reform proposal that seeks to differentiate between policy and administration).
Section 1101 of this Act would create a new Internal Revenue Service Oversight
Board to oversee the IRS's Administration, management, conduct, direction, and
supervision of the executive and application of the tax laws. However, it would
have no authority as to "the development and formulation of federal tax policy."
This proposal emanated from the Report of the National Commission on
Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service (See. 1, Recommendation 2 of the
Report).
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE: A VISION FOR A NEW IRS, Section 1, Recommendation 2, at 4

(June 25, 1997).
However, skeptics have expressed doubts whether such
distinctions could be maintained in practice were the proposal enacted. See id. at
65 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Larry Irving) ([D]rawing the line
between oversight and tax policy and management will, in my opinion, be almost
impossible to police or maintain, and ultimately will raise serious accountability
and jurisdictional questions.").

836

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:769

contracts being a kind of private constitution when it comes to
providing these services. 25 3
How much public participation
should be involved in negotiating those contracts in the first
instance and to what extent can the public receive meaningful
notice of any changes that may occur?
These are the kinds of questions that come into play as
policymakers and courts become involved in these various
attempts to create new blends of public and private power.
Though issues such as snow removal, garbage collection, or even
private prisons, may initially seem somewhat remote from the
global economy, the public/private issues they embody go to the
heart of the most fundamental challenge globalization makes on
the de-centered state and our ability to govern ourselves.
Moreover, the techniques themselves are a product of a
globalizing state that seeks to redefine itself in this new era. It is,
therefore, important that these partnerships be seen as raising
issues involving the appropriate mixes of private and public
regimes and values. A labeling exercise that uses an either/or
kind of methodology will miss important chances to maintain or
encourage a modicum of democratic decision-making, especially if
it concludes certain decisions, once public, are now private. At
the same time, too formulaic an approach to what is public can
incorporate so many governmental requirements as to undercut
the globalizing state's need to experiment with innovative and
presumably less costly ways of achieving common goals and ends.
However, recognizing that a new mix of public and private
power may now be necessary in certain areas does not mean that
history is irrelevant. Public/private partnerships are not formed
in a vacuum. In some contexts, what is being privatized has long
been considered a public function. As such, it may be relatively
easy, for state action doctrine purposes, to view many aspects of
the private sector as essentially public. In other contexts what is
now considered to be an important public decision may,
historically, always have been viewed as private.
This is
especially true of certain economic decisions to invest or withdraw
capital from certain markets. This factor may militate in favor of
a different blend of public and private power. 2 s4 From a court's
perspective, questions involving a substantial change from past
practice are best addressed by legislatures, especially when
formally private decisions are involved. But issues having to do
with where the market ends and the market metaphors begin,
i.e., issues having to do with what the blend of public and private
power should be, usually are in the province of the courts. So too

253.
254.

See HARDEN, supranote 124, at 44-45, 75-77.
See generallySTRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM, supranote 19.
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is the determination of the relevant context in which these issues
arise.
A global perspective on such issues places a premium on
doctrinal approaches
that further rather than restrict
policymaking creativity in this regard and realistically maintain
the kind of public input necessary to ensure, to the extent
possible, that the globalizing state's attempts to maximize its own
efficiency does not minimize democracy. The analysis of private
prisons as a distinct form of outsourcing and the recent Supreme
Court decision in McKnight v. Richardson25 5 in the -section that
follows will apply a global perspective to the public/private issues
the Court faced.
B. Private Prisonsand the Global Economy
Private prisons are not new in the history of the U.S.2 5 6 They
were particularly common in the nineteenth century, 25 7 but they
have re-emerged as an important reform in the last fifteen years
or so. 2 58 There are many reasons for their popularity. As prisons
have become overcrowded, privatized prisons offer an alternative
to state construction and management that may be performed at
a lower cost. The theory is that private sector providers will
compete among themselves for a state's business by providing for
more efficiently run and, in some instances, more efficiently
constructed prisons than the government can provide. 25 9 Implicit
in this approach is that every few years or so, at contract time,
competition will re-emerge, making sure that the present provider

is, in fact, the most efficient. This, of course, assumes that the
price of entry-construction of a new facility-will not be a
significant bar to future competition. If only the management of
prisons is involved, such competition theoretically can occur
2 60
much more easily.
When comparing private prisons to publicly managed
facilities, the question that arises is: what are the bases of this
competition? Clearly, if the competition is based on providing a
secure and humane environment more cheaply than a public
bureaucracy can, private prisons increase the global competitive
currency of a state in an acceptable manner. If some of these

255.

McKnightv. Richardson, 117 S.Ct. 2100 (1997).

256.
See generally HARDING, supranote 244.
257.
See, e.g., McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2104-05; James Theodore Gentry,
The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J.

353 (1986).
258.
259.
260.

Id.; see also HARDING, supranote 244, at 3.
See, e.g., HARDING, supranote 244, at 3; Gentry, supranote 257.
See, e.g., Gentry, supranote 257, at 357-58.
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lower costs, however, derive from the fact that fewer constitutional

protections are applied to private inmates than those held in public
prisons, legal issues may arise which, eventually, may and should
2 61
eliminate such forms of competition.
It is not yet clear how far courts will go to extend constitutional
protections such as due process, for example, to privately run
prisons. 2 62 Were they to be exempt from all or part of these
constitutional protections, they would be indicative of the worst of
globalization trends: the removal of public rights and dialogues by
the simple device of moving what was once public to the private
sector. This is perhaps unlikely, 26 3 given the nature of the
relationship between a contracting governmental body and a private
prison provider, the state's duty to enforce its laws and house its
criminals, and the various ways in which the market cannot apply
with full rigor to this kind of situation. Nevertheless, apart from the
potential savings in cost that a more efficiently managed prison
promises, there are other political reasons, some of them marginal or
even illegitimate, that also can fuel this transfer of functions from the
public to the private sector.

261. If, for example, prison guards can simply tie up inmates with
straightjackets (as in McKnight) and leave them for days at a time, certainly
Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment concerns should arise. Without
the possibility of constitutional oversight in the federal courts, these fundamental
rights-already litigated and settled in the federal courts-would be rendered

moot by a nationwide wave of such "outsourcing." The system may soon have an
opportunity to address these questions in the context of abuse in privately run
juvenile prisons. The Tallulah Correctional Center for Youth, a privately run
detention facility in Tallulah, Louisiana, came under harsh criticism amid
allegations of physical abuse by guards, failure to educate and counsel the
youths, and arbitrary and severe punishments for misbehavior. Louisiana's
juvenile prison system is just one of a series being investigated by the U.S.
Justice Department.
Kentucky, Puerto Rico, and Georgia are also under
investigation, and 'private juvenile prisons in Colorado, Texas, and South
Carolina have been successfully sued by individuals and groups or forced to give
up their licenses." Fox Butterfield, Profits at Juvenile Prisons Earned at a Chilling
Cost, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 1998 at Al.
262.
See generally Douglas W. Dunham, Inmates' Rights and the
Privatization of Prisons, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1475 (1986) (arguing that
comprehensive safeguards are necessary to ensure the protection of inmates'
constitutional rights in private prisons); Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure
of America's Prison Privatization Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371 (1997)
(considering whether privatization statutes establish correctional systems that
conform with constitutional "due process").
263.
See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614
(1991) (addressing actions by a private individual during the trial process which
may be considered a "state action" when the individual violates a party's
constitutional rights); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)
(addressing certain actions of private entities that may constitute "state action"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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Global competition has, as we have seen, focused on the need
for individuals, corporate entities, and states to be maximally
competitive. This has spawned a rhetoric that, along with the
drive for efficiency, can be intensely anti-state in its assumptions
as well. Any number of state functions, when compared to the
ideal of the market, usually come up short.2 64 As noted above,2 6 s
however, it is very difficult to compare public duties to pure
market approaches when only outsourcing is involved. Private
prisons, in particular, do not fit easily into the private ordering,
contractual model.
The idea of private prisons also can involve political overtones
that can exacerbate some of the more retributive trends in
current approaches to criminals and criminal behavior. In the
minds of some people, prisons exist primarily to punish those who
break the law. For some, the impersonal harshness of the market
may seem more appropriate for such law breakers, especially if it
means that an efficiently run prison will not provide certain legal
amenities or services that criminals will be deemed to have
forfeited. A "no nonsense," efficient market environment can be
seen, politically, as being more punitive, thus also increasing the
266
popularity of privatized prisons as a regulatory reform.
How should the courts treat private prisons? The context of
global competition requires courts ultimately to assess carefully
not just what is public or what is private, but what the blend of
these two systems should be. To do this, courts should be
skeptical of labels and determine at what point the market
becomes a metaphor that is inapplicable to the issues at hand.
When that occurs, are the policies of the market appropriate for
an institution that is privately run, but publicly required? When
the market becomes more metaphorical than real, how should a
court assess the blend of public and private power that results?
To what extent can public input into private prison decisions be
required and how often should this occur? Finally, at what point
should a court conclude that the global currency created from
certain aspects of privatization should not be allowed? These are
2 67
some of the key questions presented in McKnight v. Richardson.

264.
See, e.g., Rep. Philip M. Crane's proposal to privatize the U.S. Postal
Service, 135 CONG. REc. E547-48 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1989) ("The performance of
the post office can only be improved by transferring it to the private sector.").
265.
See supratext accompanying notes 240-55.
266.
Of course, one can imagine a more positive view of private prisons as
well, one where a more efficiently trained workforce runs a cleaner, more effective
facility. But even the more positive political rhetoric that can surround this
reform is implicitly negative vis-a-vis the state. It reinforces the laissez-faire
conception of the state noted above, by its implication that the market can handle
prisons more effectively than government.
267.
117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
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1. McKnight v. Richardson
Ronnie Lee McKnight brought suit against two prison guards
in a private prison in Tennessee.2 6 8 He alleged that they had
violated his constitutional rights by injuring him with extremely
tight physical restraints. 2 6 9 He brought suit under section 1983,
even though he was incarcerated in a private prison. 2 70 The
private prison guards moved to dismiss, claiming the same kind
of qualified immunity that would apply if they had been guards in
a public prison facility. 27 1 The U.S. District Court, the Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court all agreed that qualified
immunity did not extend to private prison guards. 2 7 2 Recognizing
that section 1983 can sometimes result in imposing liability upon
a private individual, all three courts resisted the application of a
defense commonly used by public officials doing essentially the
27 3
same job.
The Supreme Court split 5-4 on this issue.2 7 4 Writing for the
majority, Justice Breyer found that there was no historical
precedent requiring an extension of qualified immunity to private
prison guards. 2 75 More importantly, he analyzed the market
context in which immunity might apply and rejected its extension
on policy grounds as well. 2 76 The dissent disagreed on both
counts-history and policy. For the dissent, nothing in the past
affinmatively prevented the extension of qualified immunity to
private prisons.2 77 In fact, public and private prisons were
functionally the same. 2 78 For the dissent, the fact that there was

no precedent barring the extension of this common-law-based

immunity meant it could be applied. 2 79 For the majority, the fact
that there was no precedent authorizing this extension was
further evidence that the extension of this immunity was not
2 80
required.

268.
See id. at 2102.
269.
See id.
270.
See id.
271.
See id.
272.
See id.
273.
See id. at 2102-03.
274. See id. at 2108 (hoting the dissent of Justices Scalia, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, and Thomas).
275. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2105.
276. Id. at 2106.
277.
See id. at 2108-09.

278. See id. at 2108-09 (noting that the two prison systems perform the
same duties).
279. Id. at 2109.
280. Id. at 2105-06.
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It is at the policy level where the differences between the
majority and the minority are particularly instructive. The mix of
private and public that the majority's decision sanctioned
arguably would provide more protections for the prisoners than if
qualified immunity were to extend to them. The majority saw the
use of the market more as a means of assuring certain public
values than as an end in itself. Its refusal to adopt the functional

approach advocated

by the dissent resulted in a complex

approach to issues involving both citizen/consumers and
prisoners. The majority's conclusion that private guards were not
entitled to the qualified immunity public prison guards would
receive was, ironically, premised on public law values, including
the constitutional rights of the prisoners involved and an implicit
argument that cost was not the only relevant factor in deciding
how best to determine the appropriate public/private blend in
this case. 28 1 In short, the results in this case are best explained
by seeing the majority's preference for a private approach as best
serving the needs of the prisoners involved as well as the public's
responsibility. The dissent's more functional approach would
have extended the public label to this context, but primarily for
cost considerations.
2. The Public/Private Mix
The majority analyzed the market approach of a private
prison against a backdrop of public law.2 82 In fact, in contrasting
private prisons with public prisons, the majority implied that in
this context public prisons seemed to embody the status quo:
[G]overnment employees typically act within a different system. They
work within a system that is responsible through elected officials to
voters who, when they vote, rarely consider the performance of
individual subdepartments or civil servants specifically and in detail.

And that system is often characterized by multidepartment civil service
rules that, while providing employee security, may limit the incentives
or the ability of individual departments or supervisors flexibility to
2 83
reward, or to punish, individual employees.

Indeed, though the majority sought to describe two different
systems, the public and the private, it opted for a combination of

the two, favoring greater reliance on the market when it came to
advancing the primary purpose of the immunity doctrineavoiding either timid or overly aggressive behavior on the part of
the guards involved.2 8 4 Indeed, in the public prison context,

281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.at2105.
Id.
Id. at 2107.
d. at 2105.
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immunity from suit was justified primarily on the ground that
public guards should not have to fear that, simply by doing their
duty, they would be subjected to a lawsuit. 2 85
For the majority, private prisons provided ample incentives
for guards to behave properly, including more opportunities for
market-sensitive supervisors either to reward or to discipline
them, if they were too aggressive or not aggressive enough when
dealing with prisoners. 28 6 In addition, the majority emphasized

that in the private sector, it was commonly understood that the
prison providers would purchase insurance coverage for guards
that were held liable for damages resulting from prison lawsuits
such as in this case.2 8 7 Moreover, as the majority saw it, there
also was more public input into this process, when prisons were,
in fact in private prisons. Since the prison contract expires after
three years, "its performance is disciplined not only by state
review... but also by pressure from potentially competing firms
who can try to take its place." 28 8 In a sense, this three year
review and the choice of other providers the state may have is a
very effective way of ensuring public input that is focused and
28 9
directed specifically towards the tasks of running a prison.
More importantly, by not extending immunity to the guards
themselves, the court recognized but disregarded the significance
of any distractions that might result from lawsuits. This was a
small price to pay 'given a continued and conceded need for
determining constitutional violations ...
"290 Indeed, one could
view the resulting jury trials as another form of public, citizen
input into this private regime, one that does not normally exist in
the public realm. In the context of qualified immunity, the use of
market forces may, in fact, result not only in a well-run prison,
but actually enhance the public accountability and public input
aspects of this regime as compared to public prisons. In short,
the majority opted to treat private prisons as private, when it
291
came to the qualified immunity doctrine.
3. The Limits of the Market Metaphor
It is ironic that the more conservative wing of the Supreme
Court, through Justice Scalia, would argue for a result that would
extend the public aspect of prisons to this private regime. Justice

285.
286.
287.

Id at 2107.
Id. at 2106-07.
Id. at 2106.

288.

Id.

289.
290.

Id. at 2107.
Id.

291.

Id.
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Scalia, however, was not interested in drawing distinctions
Indeed,
between the public and the private in this context.
opting for a functional approach to public and private prisons and
their guards, the dissent could see no difference between the
2 92
public and the private in the qualified immunity context.
Prison guards performed the same functions no matter whether
Not extending
the prison was privately or publicly run. 2 93
2 94
immunity in this context made little sense, the dissent argued,
and, in fact, market incentives might actually encourage costcutting behavior that could be harmful to the prisons involved. 2 95
The insurance private providers regularly purchase could also be
obtained by public prisons and the bureaucratic complexity that
made sanctions or rewards in the public sector difficult was not,
In the final
in the dissent's view, necessarily required. 2 9 6
analysis, the dissent concluded that failure to extend immunity
2 97
it
protection in this case only added to a private prisons costs;
2 98
instance.
first
the
in
acted as a disincentive to privatize
Cost was thus an important reason underlying the dissent's
desire to extend the public umbrella over privatized prisons. But
also underlying the dissent's opinion was a desire for a bright line
approach for determining what was public and private. This was
clear in the way the dissent focused on the limits of the
applicability of what it considered to be "real market" forces and,
by implication, the limits of the market as a metaphor. The
majority tested those limits against the policies it thought the
approach might generate; the dissent tested those limits against
microeconomic theory.
Indeed, the dissent refused to use the market as a metaphor
or as a means of blending aspects of the public and the private.
There was a clear line between the two and this justified the all
public approach it advocated:
[I]t is fanciful to speak of the consequences of "markef pressures
in a regime where public officials are the only purchaser, and other
people's money the medium of payment. Ultimately, one prisonmanagement firm will be selected to replace another prison
management firm only if a decision is made by some political official
not to renew the contract....This is a government decision, not a
299
market choice.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 2112.
Id. at2107.
Id. at 2112-13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2107.
Id. at 2111.
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The dissent went on to discount the significance of public input at
this point in the process and resisted comparing that input to
anything like a real market choice. 3° The dissent did not suggest
that such input was impossible, but that it certainly was unlikely:
The process can come to resemble a market choice only to the
extent that the political actors will such resemblance-that is, to
the extent that political actors (1) are willing to pay attention to the
issue of prison services, among the many issues vying for their
attention, and (2) are willing to place considerations of cost and
quality of service ahead of such political considerations as personal
friendship, political alliances, in-state ownership of the contractor,
301
etc.

In effect, the dissent refused to recognize the market as a
metaphor and resisted blending the public with the private or the
uses of the private to accomplish public ends. As far as the dissent is
concerned, prison operation is a public function and there is no
difference between public prisons and prisons run on behalf of the
public by private providers. The dissent's preference for the public is
premised on the belief that a bright line exists between these two
worlds and that the real reason for opting for the private sector is
price. 3° 2 As a result, because "a contractor's profits must depend
upon its costs," the end result of the majority's decision would be,
quite simply, to increase costs.3 0 3

And under such circumstances,

private prison guards are in as much need of immunity as their

public counterparts.

30 4

Similarly, the dissent discounts the majority's reasoning
regarding the differences that privatization of prisons makes as
far as insurance coverage is concerned, as wel as the relatively
easy ways in which private employers can discipline their
employees.3 0 5 The dissent finds it ironic that outsourcing prisons
should result in rules that make them more expensive. 30 6 For the
dissent, public prison guards can also purchase insurance,30 7
why they need have so many civil law
and there is no 3reason
08
service restraints.
More importantly, the dissent sees no difference between
public and private prison guards when it comes to the
constitutional rights of prisoners: "One would think that private
prison managers, whose § 1983 damage come out of their own

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2111-13.
Id. at 2111.
Id. at 2112.

306.

Id. at 2112-13.

307.

Id. at 2111-12.

308.

Id.
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pockets, as compared with public prison managers, whose § 1983
damages come out of the public purse, would, if anything, be
more careful in training their employees to avoid constitutional
infractions."30 9 The dissent concluded that it saw "no sense in
the public-private distinction" nor did it "see what precisely it
3 10
consists of."
The methodology used by the majority in this case to

determine whether a private or public perspective was to prevail
resulted in a decision that favored the market approach for
essentially public reasons.
By resisting a precedent-bound
historical approach, the majority was free to entertain a variety of
policy arguments that applied private rationales for public ends.
The dissent's more functional approach certainly has the merit of
resisting a simple labeling approach, based on the nature of the
service provider, but it also was indicative of an all-or-nothing
approach often used by courts in state action cases, and a
recognition that there is a bright line between the public and the
private, with minimal overlap between the two.
C. Implications of the GlobalizingState for Public/PrivateLaw
As we have seen, the globalizing state approaches problems
in ways that often resemble those of the global corporate entities
they seek to influence. Thus, like global corporations, states
downsize, decentralize, or deregulate, and they call upon the
market and private actors to achieve their goals. 3 1 Contractingout or outsourcing to the private sector is an increasingly
common way for states to carry out their public responsibilities.
The state also has used, with increasing frequency, various
market structures, and market regulatory techniques to carry out
its duties.3 12 All of these approaches and interactions with the
private sector involve aspects of the public/private distinction,
but this distinction no longer demarcates two very distinct areas
as it once did.
The concept of the globalizing state emphasizes the
importance of ensuring that courts and policymakers understand
the complexities of the public/private distinction as it now arises.

309.
310.

Id. at 2112.
Id.

311.
See, e.g., Adam Melita, Note, Much Ado About $26 Million: Implications
of Privatizing the Collection of Delinquent FederalTaxes, 16 VA. TAX REv. 699, 727

(1997) (examining the broader tax policy ramifications that underlie the spirit of
the pilot program, namely that private collection of federal taxes may be more
efficient than the present system).
312. See Aman, A Global Perspective On Current Regulatory Reform, supra
note 59, at 454-62.
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First, given the tendency of globalization processes to put a
premium on market processes and outcomes, it is important to
understand the extent to which private forces and techniques are
involved to reach public ends, thereby maintaining a state
connection to what otherwise may seem to be essentially private
activities. Second, given the new pressures experienced by states
and the strength of global markets, the resort to the private sector
need not be simply evidence of agency capture or the triumph of a
relatively pure form of global capitalism. Rather, treaties such as
NAFTA, contracting-out of governmental services, and the use of
market regulatory structures and techniques, are but the
beginnings of new approaches on the part of the global state to
achieve public interest ends-ends which may be in a global
public interest.
Third, the realms of public and private
themselves have been and are subject to the processes of
globalization. Domestic law processes that involve the private
sector very directly in the lawmaking process will often include
the global perspective of many of the participants involved in
these issues. Similarly, in many areas of regulation and state
involvement, the public realm itself does not stop at U.S. borders.
For certain kinds of regulation to be effective, the global state
must link up with other states on a global or regional basis. Thus,
governmental decision-makers need to bring a global perspective to
issues that may seem to evoke familiar debates over the local and the
global, but in fact now require a broader political, economic, and legal
framework of analysis. A global perspective is, in reality, a critical
one. It seeks to determine the extent to which domestic decisions by
Congress, administrative agencies, and the courts further flexible,
public/private partnerships, as well as preserve or create
opportunities for public participation.
This perspective is also
normative, in that it posits the importance of maintaining a public
viewpoint in decision-making processes that might otherwise be
private.
The globalizing state highlights the need for encouraging and
protecting the norm of democratic decision-making as well as the
need for facilitating the kind of flexibility necessary for new kinds
of public/private and state/federal partnerships to form. These
goals as well as the more traditional goals of private and public
law are greatly affected by the way courts approach the

public/private distinction in the various contexts in which it now

arises.3 1 3 The issues are complex because, depending upon the
context, labeling something as private does not necessarily mean

313.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 268-310.
See generally
Symposium, The New Private Law, supra note 3 (providing examples of how
private law can merge or take on public law aspects).
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that the legal consequences of that label will yield negative results
from a policy point of view, even when judged by public law values
3 14
such as accountability, transparency, and participation.
Similarly, labeling something as public does not mean that such
values are always encouraged or furthered.3 1 s The market and
market regulatory approaches can be very effective regulatory
tools, and some governmental or public approaches can represent
3 16
a decision to opt for the status quo.

There are other facets of privatization in addition to creative
problem solving. The desire on the part of governments at all
levels to lower their costs and to create the currency of global
competition is one of the main motivating forces for privatization.
Lower regulatory costs make it easier to attract new business to a
locality or to retain old ones. But quite apart from cost, the
decline in public confidence in the ability of government to
perform any number of functions efficiently or competently has
made governmental resorts to the private sector politically
popular as well. This fact alone requires that the rhetoric of
global competition must, at times, be separated from the reality of
the reform involved. To invoke the language and concepts of the
private sector in contexts that are or should remain public can
unnecessarily diminish the role of democracy.
Like the interpretation of the public/private distinction,
much is at stake in judicial decisions that draw bright lines
between federal and state power. The pressures of global
competition on the state for low-cost, regulatory, or deregulatory
approaches to issues, create incentives to conceptualize new
mixtures of public and private power as essentially private, rather
than public. But these pressures are increased by the role the
state itself now plays as it affirmatively seeks to retain and attract
new investment to its own jurisdiction. As the globalizing state
attempts to create additional currency to compete in the global
economy, the ways in which courts view doctrines that allocate
power between the public and private sector take on major
significance, especially when dealing with so-called local issues.

As Part IV has shown, these often are the arenas in which the
values of democracy are at stake. But courts cannot fight all
such battles alone. Legislatures must also be involved. As Part V
will now show, fragmenting democracy by constitutionalizing
certain interpretive approaches to federalism may deprive the
globalizing state of the flexibility it needs to ensure that such

314. See Peller, supra note 197 (discussing public schools and various
reform proposals); see also Aronson, supranote 125.
315.

See Peller, supranote 197, at 1004-05.

316.

Id.
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concepts as citizenship, sovereignty, and democracy remain
relevant in the twenty-first century.
Part V will argue that recent federalism decisions risk making
certain kinds of federal action problematic. The ability of the
federal government to act in certain situations that involve new

mixtures of local as well as national concerns may be necessary if
effective legal regimes are to develop. It is, therefore, especially
important to understand and to assess the significance of recent
judicial trends involving federalism from a global perspective.

V.

THE GLOBALIZING STATE AND FEDERALISM

Since the founding of the republic, power in the United States
has generally flowed from the states to the national
government. 3 17 As local economies became more integrated with
a growing national economy, the logic of Supreme Court
decisions, particularly those after 1937, almost always resolved
disputes between federal and state levels of governance in favor of
national power. 3 18 Post New-Deal, the outcome in cases involving
the scope of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution seemingly
had become such a foregone conclusion that it prompted then
Justice Rehnquist's quite pointed concurrence in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association Inc.3 19 "Although it is
clear that the people, through the States, delegated authority to
Congress to 'regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,'
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, one could easily get the sense from
this Court's opinions that the federal system exists only at the
sufferance of Congress."3 20 Indeed, he viewed the proposition
that Congress exercises only power delegated to it as "one of the
321
greatest ictions' of our federal system."
Chief Justice Rehnquist now speaks for a majority on the
Court whose approaches to federalism issues are more open to
arguments involving state autonomy and rejecting expansive
readings of the Commerce Clause. Specifically, the Court takes

317.
See generally Phillip Kurland, The Role of the Supreme Court in
American History: A Lawyer's Interpretation, 14 BUCKNELL REV., NO. 3, 16-26
(1966) (discussing the Supreme Court's role in marking the boundary between
state and national authority).

318. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1957) (the so-called
switch-in-time that saved nine case); Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314-15 (1955) (showing that the vote in West Coast Hotel was
taken before legislation to expand court was proposed).
319. Hodel v. Van Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
320.
321.

I. at 307-08.
Id. at 307.
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issue with attempts by the federal government to "commandeer"
state bureaucracies to carry out federal mandates. 32 2 Moreover,
the Court attempts to breathe new meaning into the Tenth
Amendment by arguing, for example, that federal regulation of
guns near schools is too local an issue to be supported by the
3 23
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
While a good doctrinal argument can be made in support of
the Court's decisions in some of these cases, 3 24 the reasoning in
these cases suggests a shift in the Court's methodology to such
issues and its underlying philosophical approach to federal-state
issues that transcends the facts of these cases. This shift in

emphasis from federal power to state autonomy and power
coincides with economic and political shifts in the global economy
that also encourage decentralization of power. However,
interpreting these changes in federal-state relations in a manner
that diminishes the flexibility of federal and state policymakers to
experiment with new regulatory approaches runs the risk of
substantially undermining the range of policy alternatives and
administrative structures necessary for the global state to be
32 s
effective.
A. A Global Perspective on Federalism
The Court's shift in the power relationships between the
nation and the states and its underlying rationale for this change
are likely to encourage more competitive models of the global
state, at the expense of developing a more cooperative-based
understanding of the state at both the national and the
international levels. The emphasis on the individuality of states
and their identities and power increases the transaction costs of
reaching cooperative agreements that could apply to all states. In
a sense, an extreme view of federalism would make national
legislation as difficult as negotiating multi-lateral treaties. This is
not to argue that a "race to the bottom" is inevitable in such a

322. See, e.g., New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991).
323. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
324. See Barry Friedman, Federalism'sFuture in the Global Village, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1441 (1994) (arguing that the Court reinstated state sovereignty in New
York v. United States).

325.

For a discussion of federalism advocating an alternate view-i.e., that

federalism is an empowerment of the national government-see Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV.499, 504 (1995) ("[I]t is
desirable to have multiple levels of government all with the capability of dealing
with the countless social problems that face the United States as it enters the
21st century.").
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situation.3 2 6 It is to argue, however, that creative, cooperative
approaches to issues may be unnecessarily constitutionally
excluded, when they should at least be politically possible.
Moreover, the strong state assumptions used by the Supreme
Court in its analysis of federalism opinions, coupled with its
emphasis on dual citizenship, cost, and accountability, do not
sufficiently capture the heterogeneous quality of states as actors
in today's economy and the multicentric complexities of the
relationships that now typify the transnational actors that states
seek to influence. Nor does it capture the more cosmopolitan

nature of citizenship today. A citizen of a state is, of course, a
citizen of the U.S. and a global citizen as well. Individuals carry
all of these identities with them on a daily basis.3 27 The Court's
emphasis on democracy and accountability at the state level
overestimates the degree of choice states have when working by
themselves,
especially
when
the
problems
involved
simultaneously include state, federal, and often international
components. It also underestimates the cosmopolitan nature of
citizens today, and the fact that individuals are able to
differentiate among various levels of power that they believe are
involved and with which they identify.
Paradoxically, perhaps, globalization exerts a downward pull
when it comes to the exercise of both federal and state power,
providing incentives for more state autonomy and power and
more local authority within states. 3 28
At the same time,
globalization also creates pressures from outside the nation-state
to take actions that allow for international solutions to problems
such as ozone depletion or global warming. 32 9 In addition, there
are horizontal competitive forces at work as well, brought about
by transnational corporations, with economic power sometimes
approximating the power of a small state and with the capability
of locating their operations anywhere in the world. Indeed, a

326.

See,

e.g.,

Richard

Revesz,

Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:

Rethinking the "Raceto the Bottom" Rationalefor FederalEnvironmental Regulation,

67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (explaining how states race to the bottom by
relaxing environmental standards to attract industry). But see Esty, Revitalizing
EnvironmentalFederalism,supranote 30.
327.
See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotismand Cosmopolitanism, in FOR
LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITs OF PATRIOTISM 2-20 (Joshua Cohen ed.,
1996) (arguing for global allegiance over national patriotism); see also Kwame
Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, id. at 21-29 (emphasizing that people
should remember their responsibility as a world citizen).
328.
See Aman, A Global Perspective On Regulatory Reform, supra note 59,
at 435-37. For an argument that much of what courts claim are rationales for
federalism are, in reality, an argument for decentralized management, see Edward
L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
U.C.L.A. L. REV.903, 914-26 (1994).
329.
See BENEDICK, supranote 43.
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multicentric world, consisting of non-sovereign power centers
pursuing their own private interests adds another important
power dimension to federalism issues. As a consequence, issues
involving sovereignty and democracy arise that go beyond the
traditional discourse of federalism, as it has developed so
far. This is true of citizenship issues as well, as citizens in a
global world regularly function on multiple levels of political
awareness.
1. The Downward Pull of Globalization
As argued in Part 11,330 globalization encourages increasingly
intense international competition among nations, states and cities
to attract and keep industries that they believe can create
economic growth in their areas. Though the location of a plant or
manufacturing operation turns on numerous, primarily costrelated factors, low taxes and the imposition of minimal
regulatory costs on industries located in these jurisdictions
usually constitute important elements of a jurisdiction's strategy
to attract industry and jobs to a particular locale. 33 1 The tax and

regulatory policies devised on the local level to attract industries
to a certain locale are often the result of decision-making
processes that are more akin to local corporatism than to more
traditional forms of democracy. Indeed, one commentator has
noted based on a study of Japanese investment in the Midwest,
that a kind of embedded corporatism best describes the process
by which new investment is sought. 3 32 This involves, among other
things, "an activist local state working with the business class to
attract foreign investment and thereby stimulate the local
As a result of agreements among business,
economy."3 3 3
labor, substantial tax relief and various other
and
government,
as forms
incentives are commonly offered
and
cultural
economic
334
of currency in this global competition for business.
Individual states and municipalities within the U.S., eager to
attract such new investment and to retain its current industries,
have a great interest in gaining control of as many factors as
possible affecting finms' decisions to relocate to or remain in their
jurisdiction. They can create currency for global competition by
providing services such as welfare more efficiently than

330.

See supratext accompanying notes 91-117.

331.

See PERRUCCI, supranote 74, at 41-76.

332.
333.
334.

See id. at 125-45.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 131-34.
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neighboring states.3 3 s Thus, closely related to global incentives
for regulatory cost-cutting and the imposition of lower taxes at the
federal, state, and local levels, is the increased desire of each
particular jurisdiction seeking increases in economic investment
to control its own costs.
Relocating federal regulatory
responsibility for costly regulatory programs in the individual
states arguably gives states the opportunity to create more global
currency by maximizing the efficiency with which they provide
such services.
There may, of course, be some forms of global competitive
currency individual states should not be allowed to create. 3 3 6 And
there may be national interests that should take precedence over
state concerns. Level playing fields are not necessarily sought by
states when the primary motivation involved is competition.
Moreover, a level playing field in the U.S. alone does not solve the
competitive problems of states that arise from competition from other
parts of the globe. The multicentric aspects of the global economy
stem from the fact that there are multiple state and non-state power
centers capable of affecting where investments may or may not
occur. All of these pressures militate in favor of decentralized
decision-making.

2. The Pull from the Top-National and International Pressures
Increasing a state's power to control the costs imposed on its
inhabitants and potential investors through devolution is only one
aspect of current federalism trends.
There are also forces
operating simultaneously to reinforce federal powers. National
standards and approaches may be necessary to prevent the
creation of illegitimate global currency. 33 7
They also are
necessary to achieve certain levels of regulatory uniformity if
businesses are to avoid an unnecessary differing patchwork quilt
of state rules and regulations. 338 More importantly, there also are
issues such as the environment, in which it is in the interest of
nation-states to play an active regulatory role at the global level.

335.
See Aman, Administrative Law For A New Century, supra note 17, at
101.
336.
For example, private prisons' costs should not be lower because there
are fewer constitutional protections available to prisoners.
337. See, e.g., Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 30;
Diane P. Wood, United States Antitrust Law in the Global Market, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL

LEGAL STUD. 409 (1994).
338. See EsTY, GREENING THE GATT, supranote 203, at 108-11; see also J.
William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors Under U.S. Securities Laws: The
Impact of InternationalRegulatory Competition, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 431,
464 (1994) (arguing that federal and state regulators must cooperate to protect
securities markets).
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Effective national participation at the global level requires a
national "presence" in certain domestic areas affected by these
global concerns.
And indeed, international agreements and
multilateral approaches have been increasing at a rapid rate. 3 3 9
For example, if there were no effective national control over air
pollution, it would be very difficult for the national government to
speak for all fifty states and enter into serious negotiations at the
global level.

The ability of the national government to participate
effectively in global issues at the international level can help
mitigate the extremes of global competition. Along with the trend
toward a devolution of federal power there is also at least the
beginning of an evolutionary trend involving the national
government more directly in sharing in the responsibilities of
international governance.3 40 At the national level, this trend
toward multinational decision-making and problem-solving often
expresses itself negatively in debates over the undue restriction of
national sovereignty, 34 ' but international cooperation and
nonetheless increasing.342
multinational agreements are
International cooperation and regulation highlight the importance
of the national government's ability to play an active role at the
domestic level. To the extent that federal power is limited in this
regard, enforceable international regulatory regimes are more
difficult to create than when only one major decision-maker is
involved. 343
3. Horizontal Forces and the Transnational Corporation
3 44
Federalism traditionally is seen primarily in vertical terms.
Usually, the flow of power involved is between state and federal

339. For example, according to the Multilaterals Project at Tufts University,
at least 36 major multilateral environmental treaties have opened for signature
since 1972. <http://wwwv.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multilaterals.html>.
340. Id.; see, e.g., WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,

OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
341. For example, consider the debate over sovereignty that occurred when
the World Trade Organization was established. See also Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp. Hearing on Fast Track legislation, 1997 WL 605646
(F.D.C.H.) (Sept. 30, 1997) (comments by Senator Ernest F. Hollings, D-SC)
(arguing that NAFTA has not lived up to its potential).

342. For a public choice perspective on this overall increase in international
agreements, see Enrico Columbatto & Jonathan Macey, A Public Choice Model of
InternationalEconomic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO
L. REv.925 (1997).
343. See, e.g., supra note 341 (including part of a recent Congressional

debate on the renewal of fast track authority).
344.

Of course, it can be horizontal as well when, for example, states try to

take advantage of other states. See, e.g., dominant Commerce Clause cases such
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centers of authority. A global perspective introduces not only an
additional vertical level of power, namely the international level,
but additional horizontal dimensions as well. 34 5
A global
perspective emphasizes the fact that states outside the U.S. now
play an increasingly important role when it comes to global
competition and it also highlights the significant role non-state
actors, such as transnational corporations, now play in
influencing local legal regimes and policies. The ability of nonstate actors to render a sense of place relatively irrelevant when it
comes to deciding where to locate its plant, for example,
substantially undercuts the ability of individual governments,
state or federal, to regulate the activities of such entities

effectively. The fact that capital moves relatively freely from state
to state also means that investment can sometimes leave as
quickly as it may have come. 3 46 The jurisdictional difficulties
faced by states trying to influence such actors cannot be dealt
with as it was during the New Deal, when federal regulatory
regimes leveled the playing field nationwide. There are now many
other countries involved, and international approaches are
necessary if state intervention and a more cooperative approach
to international governance is the goal.3 4 7 Of course, if a strong

state laissez-faire response is the goal, then maximum
decentralization of power would further that kind of global
economy. This is and should be a political decision, however, and
not one subject to constitutional dictates.
In short, the transnational or horizontal character of these
entities introduces an independent and significant power
relationship into the equation that substantially undercuts the
power of states to influence these entities in ways individual
states believe further the public interest. The economic power
that some of these entities possess and the structural economic
issues or choices they can present for states and individuals, in
some ways, makes them somewhat akin to states themselves. 348

as Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (holding
unconstitutional an Iowa law prohibiting 65 foot trailers within its borders).
These issues, however, involve only states and are controlled by the relationship
of the state law to the Commerce Clause.
345.
For a discussion of the power of transnational corporations and their
impact on politics, see STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supra note 6, at 4454. "[T]he progressive integration of the world economy . . . has shifted the
balance of power away from states toward world markets. That shift has led to
the transfer of some powers in relation to civil society from territorial states to
TNC's." Id. at 46.
346.
See generally STRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM, supranote 19.
347. See THE GROUP OF LISBON, supranote 23.
348.
See STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE, supranote 6, at 54 (arguing
that if one excludes war and peace, and focuses more broadly on day to day
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There is, in effect, a much more distinct private power center that
no longer can easily be neutralized by a set of uniform rules, even
at the national level.
4. Global Citizenship
Citizenship operates on multiple levels today. Legal residents
who live in states are U.S. citizens, but they often also identify
their economic interests with the transnational corporation they
work for or that invests capital in the community in which they
live.
On a more public interest level, local and national citizens
increasingly are aware of the global implications of local or
national decisions and these, too, are becoming a part of everyday
politics. For example, the debate over the tobacco settlement has
a global component to it. If the settlement makes it easy for
companies to open new markets abroad, this factor does and
should affect a local, domestic political response. 34 9 Similarly,
environmental regulation that moves certain industries off-shore,
thereby increasing global pollution, also should be factors at the
3 50
state and federal levels of political discussion.

Global citizenship involves multiple identities and the ability
of citizens to differentiate among the various roles that different
levels of government perform. At the same time, built into these
multiple identities are often conflicting and conflicted responses
to certain issues. What might further one's local interest may
harm the global competitiveness of the entities that contribute to
the economic health of an area or region. These are the kinds of
trade-offs the political process makes on a regular basis, but it is
important that all levels of government-municipal, state, federal,
and international-be involved in the decision-making mix as
much as possible. A constitutional approach to the allocation of
power issues involved that maximizes political choice at all levels
of citizenship and government is preferable to one that forecloses
important considerations from public debate, as well as individual
contemplation.
A global perspective on power allocation issues between federal
and state governments thus provides us with additional criteria with
which to evaluate the Court's federalism decisions. It also creates
additional concerns when it comes to global governance and the role
of individual states in that process. As we begin to analyze concepts

economic issues, transnational corporations have come to play a significant role
in determining who gets what in the world system).
349.
See generally Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for
Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 273-78 (1996).
350.
See generallyAman, The EarthAs Eggshell Victim, supranote 32.
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of federalism from a global perspective, democracy and public
participation questions loom large. Traditional federalism responses
and calls for a return to pre-New Deal days do not necessarily solve
these problems, given the global dispersion of power that now exists.
Just as it is impossible to recreate the sense of the private that
existed in an earlier historic era, it is impossible to view states as
independent units of power, unaffected by actors and problems that
do not correlate with geographic boundaries. It may be that there
needs to be more local control over certain issues, but there may also
need to be new forms of governance and participation at the global
level. Judicial approaches that unnecessarily limit these new
possibilities may do more harm than good by, in effect, playing a role
somewhat akin to the role the Court played as this country began,
politically coming to grips with the legal and economic implications of
35 1
a national economy.
B. Sovereignty, Federalism,and the Court
A rigid concept of state sovereignty emerges from the Court's
recent opinions declaring certain federal acts in violation of the
Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment.3 5 2 A strong state set
of assumptions underlies the Court's analyses in these cases,
assumptions which may undermine future attempts to create the
fluid, governmental and private partnerships
multilevel,
necessary for the globalizing state to be relevant, much less
effective. The Court's notion of state sovereignty is steeped in
nineteenth century precedents and the consequent view of state
power that conceptualizes individual states as separate and
distinct from federal power and the power of other states. This
conception of states is in stark contrast to the fluidity of state
35 3
borders and the multicentric aspects of their make up today.
Just as nation-states are not unified entities capable of devising

351.

See

ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

117-38 (1987)

(tracing the court's role in the economic development of the United States).

See

generally Ellis Hawley, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 127-30
(1966) (noting how the Court struck down New Deal legislation).
352.
See, e.g., Printz v. U.S., 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding
unconstitutional the Brady Act, which required state officials to conduct
background checks); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the GunFree School Zone Act exceeded Commerce Clause power); New York v. U.S., 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a statute which required states to take
title to Low-Level Radioactive Waste); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)
(upholding the constitutionality of a Missouri law mandating retirement for
judges).
See Jan Aart Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, in THE
353.
GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
13, 23-26 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997).
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solutions to problems entirely on their own, individual states also
35 4
are an integral part of a global economy.
The Court's opinions also reflect an aspect of public choice
theory by emphasizing accountability and cost as important bases
for its decisions, especially when federal attempts to use the
apparatus of states to implement federal policies are involved. In
so doing, however, the Court emphasizes the importance of
differentiating clearly between the levels of government
responsible for these additional costs. In its view, democracy,
freedom, and liberty require that those who make decisions
should bear its costs and be accountable to the electorate who

must pay them. 3 55 Unfunded mandates, in this sense, violate the
35 6
spirit of democracy and undermine political accountability.
History, accountability, cost, and democracy are, of course,
important considerations, when viewed from a global perspective.
Yet, the bright lines the Court draws between federal and state
authority and the concept of sovereignty it employs is overly
simplistic and rigid when it comes to the fluidity of the global
economy and the flexibility required of local, state, federal, and
international policy-makers today. Similarly, the approach the
Court takes to federalism issues is steeped in a history that views
the sovereignty of states as if all of the fifty states were separate,
fully-contained entities, similar to a conception of individualism
that emphasizes liberty and independence, at the expense of
community. The separate, distinct character of states that the
Supreme Court majority assumes in its analysis of federalism
issues is reminiscent of treating states as if they were billiard
balls rather than interconnected entities in a global web of
economic and political activity. The present reality involves
issues and problems that are not at all centered in any one
nation-state, much less a sub-unit of that state.

354.

See generally J. A. CAMILLERI & J. FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY (1992)

(arguing for a globally integrated economy).
355.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) ("Were the Federal
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities,
the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and
political responsibility would become illusory."); see also Printz v. U.S., 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2377 (1997) ("The Framers' experience under the Article of Confederation
had persuaded them that using the States as the instruments of federal
governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict... [t]he
Constitution thus contemplates that a State's government will represent and
remain accountable to its own citizens.").
356.
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377.
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1. Sovereignty
The Court's self-contained, nineteenth century conception of
state sovereignty is most apparent in Gregory v. Ashcroft.3 5 7 The

manner in which the Court discussed power and its allocation
has a quaint ring to it. More importantly, though, it has little to

do with'the way states operate today in a global economy.
At issue in Ashcroft was Missouri's mandatory retirement law
for state judges. 3 5 8 That law had been challenged as a violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 35 9 In rejecting these
arguments, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found that

the ADEA was not applicable to the case at bar, using a "plain
statement" statutory interpretive approach to reach that result,
one infused with federalistic values and constitutional
assumptions. 360 In so doing, Justice O'Connor emphasized the
sovereignty of states in a fashion that suggested a zero-sum game
approach to the allocation of federal and state power:
As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system
of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal
Government. This Court also has recognized this fundamental
principle. In Tafflin v. Levitt... [w]e beg[a]n with the axiom that,
under our federal system, the states possess sovereignty
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to
limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause .... 361

Justice O'Connor then goes on to quote from an 1869 case that
describes the constitutional scheme of dual sovereigns in greater
3 62
detail:
'IT]he people of each State compose a State, having its own
government, and endowed with all the functions essential to
separate and independent existence ....
[Without the States in
union, there could be no such political body as the United States.'
Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the States through their union under the
Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the
preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance
of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions,

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

501 U.S. 452.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 460-61.
Id. at 457.
See id.
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3 63

an indestructible

Union,

859

composed of indestructible

States.

The idea of sovereignty used by Justice O'Connor thus implies a
boundedness or a division between the powers of states and the
national government that is easy to discern. It is strongly
anchored in a sense of place and it is typical of notions of
sovereignty and the state that were especially prevalent in the
nineteenth century.3 6 4 Such an approach, however, minimizes
the overlap that can and often should exist between the two
sovereigns, with a strong all-or-nothing sense of sovereignty.
Yet, the Court believes that sovereignty, so conceived, has
important policy roles to play. Not unlike the doctrine of
separation of powers that prevents the aggregation of power by
any one branch of government, federalism and state sovereignty
can also further freedom and more. As Justice O'Connor notes:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that
wvill be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous
society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry ..... 365

Indeed, in the majority's view, if our constitutional scheme is to
work, such clear lines demarcating the powers exercised by the

states must be drawn. "Just as the separation and independence
of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government
will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
3 66
front."
These policy goals-heterogeneity, democracy, innovation,
and a mobile citizenry-when viewed from a global context, are
not necessarily the same as when viewed solely as a function of
federal and state power. Global competition and the desire to
attract and retain private foreign investment from transnational
corporations is likely to encourage more homogeneity rather than
difference, as most states seek to minimize public costs so .as to

363. Texas v. White, 68 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (quoting Lane County
v. Oregon, 68 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
364. See Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as PoliticalTerritorialIdea: Historicaland Contemporary Considerations,in STATE SOVEREIGNTY

As SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS 81, 100-02 (Thomas J. Biersteken & Cynthia Weber eds.,
1996).
365. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458.
366. Id.
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maximize their ability to attract private investment. Democracy
may very well be furthered by keeping certain issues local, but
this may be at the expense of a more national democracy, one
that also allows citizens an opportunity to vote and express
themselves at the national level. Indeed, the kind of segmented
citizenship that the Court espouses does not accord with the
complex realities and multiple citizenship identities that the
3 67
global economy produces.
More importantly, public innovation, too, is likely to only take
the form of minimal taxes and lower regulatory costs, though this
in turn may encourage more private experimentation. Yet, the
more that activities move from the public realm to the private
sector, the greater the risk that global currency may be coined
locally at the expense of the weakest members of society. 36 8 The
intense competitiveness that this model encourages may
encourage more mobility among citizens in their quest to find a
modicum of financial stability. More likely, though, such mobility
will occur at the higher end of the income spectrum.3 6 9 Freedom
in the sense of making national action more difficult to achieve
may be enhanced, but at the expense of developing a more
cooperative model of global capitalism at the international and
national levels. Greater decentralization may lead to a "race to
the bottom,"3 7 0 but more importantly, it raises the transaction
costs involved in achieving more cooperative approaches to coping
3 71
with the problems of global capitalism.
The notion of sovereignty on which the Court's rationale is

based is closely akin to a metaphor of individualism, one that sees
these separate governmental entities as having a life and integrity
all their own. Obviously, one state entity may be influenced by
another and, at times, the federal power takes precedence over
the states, but the idea of an integral body resisting certain
fundamental changes from without, especially at the state level,
comes through very strongly. Just as good fences make good
neighbors, bright lines between federal and state power prevent
tyranny. Such an approach fails to consider that many of the

367. See, e.g., Dennis Conway, Are There New Complexities In Global
Migration Systems of Consequence For the United States 'Nation-State?", 2 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 35-43 (1994) (discussing international mobility, the world

as an interconnected community, and how individuals relate to and identify with
more than one country at a time).
368.
See also GREIDER, supranote 32, at 360-87; see generally GARY TEEPLE,
GLOBALIZATION AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL REFORM 69-74 (1995) (noting the impact

of the shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism on the global economy).
369.
See generally SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL, supranote 7.
370.
See Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,supra note 30, at 627-

38.
371.

See Rubin & Feeley, supranote 328.
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private actors within states have power on the level of states
37 2
themselves.
The idea of a state's integrity is the foundation of the
majority's opinion in New York v. United States.3 73 Once again,
the Court is more concerned with the forms of power, rather than
with structures that make it easy to exercise power in a flexible
way. In this case, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of the
374
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.
The Act in question was the result of various state efforts to
devise a federal structure for the regulation of low-level waste that
avoided federal preemption and retained a role for states to
play.3 7 5 In many ways, the legislative process was akin to the
negotiation and the enactment of a treaty, whereby the individual
states involved retained considerable flexibility when it came to
meeting their regulatory obligations. 3 76 The Act was the result of
a cooperative approach to federalism, one that allows states to
maintain flexibility and the primary regulatory role in their
3 77
traditional realm of protecting the public's health and safety.
The federal government set the basic standards to be met, but

rather than preempting state law, states chose the policies they

believed best achieved these standards.3 7 8 As one commentator
has noted, "in theory, the system allows states to experiment and
innovate, but not to sacrifice public health and welfare in a
379
bidding war to attract industry."
Specifically, Congress sought to achieve its federal goals by
providing certain incentives to ensure that states provide for the
disposal of radioactive waste generated within their borders.
States were authorized to impose a surcharge on radioactive

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

See infra note 348.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
See id. at 149.
See id. at 150-51.
See id. at 151-54.
As Justice White described it, in dissent:

[The Act] resulted from the efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based
set of remedies to the waste problem. They sought not federal preemption
or intervention, but rather congressional sanction of interstate
[The] 1985 Act was very much the
compromises they had reached ....
product of cooperative federalism, in which the States bargained among

themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction... [Unlike]
legislation that directs action from the Federal Government to the States,
the [Congressional action] reflected hard-fought agreements among States

as refereed by Congress.
Id. at 189-94.
378. See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our
Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1531 n.55 (1995].
379. Id. at 1532-33.
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waste received from other states, a portion of which would be
collected by the Secretary of Energy and placed in a trust account
for those states that achieved a series of milestones in developing
waste disposal sites. 38 0 States were also authorized to increase

site access costs for those states that did not meet federal
guidelines, eventually denying them access altogether. 38 1 None of
these "incentives" violated the Court's sense of state sovereignty.
A third incentive, however, provided that
[A] state that fails to provide for the disposal of all internally
generated waste by a particular date must in most cases take title
to and possession of the waste and become liable for all damages
suffered by the waste's generator or owner as a result of the state's
382
failure to promptly take possession.
38 3
For the Court, this provision created constitutional problems.
In rejecting Congress' attempt to force certain states to take
title to and possession of low-level waste, the Court emphasized
that Congress could not force the states to regulate in certain
ways or to become agents of the federal government. 38 4 Congress
could regulate individuals, but not states, because states were
sovereign.
In providing for a stronger central government, therefore, the
Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States. As we
have seen, the Court has consistently respected this choice. We
have always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the
States to require or prohibit those acts. The allocation of power
contained in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes
Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not

380.
381.
382.
383.

NewYorkv. U.S., 505 U.S. at 152.
See id. at 153.
Id. at 153.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor noted:

The actual scope of the Federal Government's authority with respect to the
States has changed over the years, therefore, but the constitutional
structure underlying and limiting that authority has not. In the end, just
as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one
views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the limits of
the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative
provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty
retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment. Either way, we must
determine whether any of the three challenged provisions of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 oversteps the boundary
between federal and state authority ....
Id. at 159.
384. See id. at 178.
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authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of
interstate commerce.3 83 In the majority's view, the
take title provision offers state governments a "choice" of either
accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the
Either type of federal action would
instructions of Congress ....
"commandeer" state governments into the services of federal
regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent
with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and
38 6
state governments.

In short, unlike states that enter into a treaty and agree to enact
certain enabling legislation to realize its goals, the Court's concept
of state sovereignty makes it impossible for the states to agree, in
the federal legislative process, to take certain kinds of actions to
carry out their promises.
Once again, this concept of sovereignty is not an end in itself,
but a way of securing "the citizens the liberties that derive from

the diffusion of sovereign power."3 8 7 Indeed, it is like the doctrine

of separation of powers: "The Constitutional authority of Congress
cannot be expanded

by the 'consent' of the government unit

whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the
3 88
Executive Branch or the States."
The Court's most recent federalism decision takes the

principles of democracy, accountability, and cost, a step further.
In Printz v. United States,3 8 9 the Court struck down the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act on grounds that the federal
the state's
government was, in effect, commandeering
enforcement apparatus to carry out a federal policy. According to
the Court, there was little doubt that Congress had the power to
regulate in this area, but it could not force states to carry out its
mandates. 390 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia emphasized
3 91
the structural rather than the textual nature of this decision.
He also emphasized democracy and accountability:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly.

385.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 175. It is interesting to note that New York was, of course,
386.
involved in the political process that produced this result. The Supreme Court,
however, rejected arguments that New York had, in effect, consented to these
"Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the
federal regulations.
States... the departure cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state officials." Id.
at 182. Cf. id at 200 (dissent by White).
387.
Id. at 181.
388.
Id. at 182.
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
389.
390.
Id. at 2383.
391. I&
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The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those
of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no caseby-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands
are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
392
sovereignty.

This case has no textual basis in the Constitution for its
result, as Justice Stevens emphasized in dissent. 3 93
More
importantly, once again the decision relied on a concept of
sovereignty that has little to do with global realities. Only Justice
Breyer chose to see this case in comparative, if not global terms,
noting that no other federal system in the world today would
3 94
prevent the use of state enforcement powers in this way.
The all-or-nothing quality of this approach, however, both
overstates and understates what is at stake, when viewed from a
global perspective. It overstates what is at stake to the extent
that it may seem that power is flowing permanently from one
body to another, as power has flowed from the states to the
federal level for over two hundred years. Yet, in a global economy,
power arrangements should be more fluid, and multigovernmental approaches often may be necessary in which the
degrees of state, federal, and international power may change over
time. Constitutionalizing these decisions removes a good deal of
this political flexibility. The debate over power levels can also
understate what is at stake to the extent that it assumes there is
any one clear, final answer which, once given, allows us to "get on
with it." A decision that concludes that it is either a federal one
or a state issue overlooks entirely the fact that non-state actors,

especially transnational corporations, are now major power
centers comparable to states in many respects. Thus, a concept
of federalism that does not include a sense of how global power is
allocated today runs the risk of undermining- the very goals it
seeks to further-democracy and liberty. It may be that moving
some decisions to the national level can more easily neutralize

392.
393.
394.

Id. at 2384.
Id. at 2386-88.
Id. at 2404, which states:

[A]t least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found
that local control is better maintained through application of a principle
that is the direct opposite of the principle the majority derives from the
silence of our Constitution. The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany
and the European Union, for example, all provide that constituent states,
not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws,
rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central federal' body.
Id. at 2404.
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inappropriate uses of private power. This may not always be the
case, but constitutionalizing certain results can remove an
important political option.
2. The Commerce Power
The ability of Congress to regulate at the national level, quite
apart from issues involving the use of a state's own enforcement
apparatus, has also been limited by the Court's view of the
In United States v. Lopez,3 95 the
Commerce power.
constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 was at
issue.3 9 6 This Act made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
3 97
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."
For the majority, this was "a criminal statute that by its terms
has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
3 98
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."
Moreover, for the majority, the argument that guns in a school
zone may result in violent crime substantially affects interstate
commerce proved too much.3 99 "Thus, if we were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate."40 0 Indeed, the majority feared that a decision holding
this Act to be within Congress' Commerce Clause power would
convert Congressional authority under that clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by States. The Court thus
concluded that the Commerce power was not infinitely
expandable, and that there are limitations "inherent in the very
4 °1
language of the Commerce Clause."
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred, emphasizing the
policy benefits of a governmental structure that divides power
"The theory that two
between federal and state authorities:
governments accord more liberty than one requires for its
realization two distinct and discernable lines of political
accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal
4°
Government; the second between the citizens and the States."
This kind of separation was crucial for true accountability to
occur:

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See id. at 551.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 561.
See id. at 551.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 576-77.
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If, as Madison expected, the federal and state governments are [to]
hold each other in check by competing for the affections of the
people, those citizens must have some means of knowing which of
the two governments to hold accountable for failure to perform a
given function ....
Were the Federal Government to take over the
regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having
nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
4 03
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.

These policy justifications for the textual interpretation given by
the majority are very much based on a conception of the state as
a unitary entity, where citizens clearly differentiate among those
who exercise power. Of course, citizens of the states also have a
vote at the federal level, and the idea that they are easily fooled by
the federal level of government at the expense of the states may
not give sufficient credit to the discerning nature of the voters
involved. But quite apart from the policy arguments, there is the
broader claim that guns, violence, and the global economy are all
interrelated, especially when education is involved.
In his dissenting opinion in Lopez, Justice Breyer takes a

very different perspective, focusing more on the school children
involved in the case and on the interrelationships of education
and the national economy and beyond. 40 4 Indeed, he emphasized
that education and business are directly related: "technological
changes and innovations in management techniques have altered
the nature of the workplace so that more jobs now demand
greater educational skills. " 4° s Moreover, Justice Breyer was the
only Justice to make the connection between the national
economy and global competition:
[G]lobal competition also has made primary and secondary
education economically more important. The portion of the
American economy attributable to international trade nearly tripled
between 1950 and 1980, and more than 70 percent of Americanmade goods now compete with imports .... At least some
significant part of this serious productivity problem is attributable
to students who emerge from classrooms without the reading or
mathematical skills necessary to compete with their European or
4 °6
Asian counterparts.

Indeed, Justice Breyer has a global conception of competition.
Every school child competes for jobs with other school children
around the globe and local jobs and prosperity turn on this
competition. He notes that "there is evidence that, today more
than ever, many firms base their location decisions upon the

403.
404.
405.
406.

See id.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 621.
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presence, or absence, of a work force with a basic education." 40 7
For Justice Breyer guns, education, and business are
interrelated: "the economic links I have just sketched seem fairly

obvious."408

He then questions "why then is it not equally

obvious, in light of those links, that a widespread, serious, and
substantial physical threat to teaching and learning also
substantially threatens the commerce to which that teaching and
learning is inextricably tied?"40 9
For Justice Breyer, the links between local violence,
education and success in the global economy are sufficiently
direct to justify federal involvement. Though he takes a global
perspective on the issues before him, his judicial approach to the
Commerce Clause is reminiscent of Wickard v. Filbum.4 10 Though
Justice Breyer is quick to add that his approach did not
"obliterate the distinction of what is national and what is
local,"4 1 1 his willingness to define the national interest by looking
beyond national borders to an interdependent global economy,
represents an approach that ultimately would vest most
regulatory decisions at the federal level, should the national
government decide to act. 4 12

In short, globalization does not

necessarily render concepts of state sovereignty based on place
irrelevant, but when compared to the interests of a national
government intent on being maximally competitive in a global
economy, it is not wise to constitutionalize such political decisions
when a national response is politically appropriate. Given the
political nature of the decisions involved in passing an act of
Congress, a flexible judicial response is required.
Perhaps the Court should not be faulted for analyzing federalism
issues in a framework that is dominated by nineteenth century
concepts of federalism, embodied in nineteenth century precedents.
Yet, the Court's effort to reestablish what often appears to be a preNew Deal position vis-a-vis national power, overlooks an aspect of
New Deal judicial processes that remains highly relevant for the
global state. Courts should avoid constitutionalizing issues when it

407.
408.

Id. at 622.
Id. at 622-23.

409.

Id.

410.

Wickardv.-Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing Congress to regulate

the production of a single farmer because of the aggregation effect).
411. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 624 (1995).
412.
One could argue that Justice Breyer's approach proves too much, i.e.,
the links between global and domestic economies are so apparent as to assure a
federal result. As this Article has argued, the distinction between the global and

various forms of the local has collapsed; this does not mean Congress must
automatically act. It is not compelled to act. Rather, the issues are now political
issues to be acted on in the political process, without such judicial intervention,
as contemplated in Lopez.
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is not necessary to do so. Indeed, though the Court may have been
concerned with costs being imposed on states unnecessarily, such
matters are best dealt with legislatively. Fragmentation need not be
the most likely outcome of the global state and courts need not take
the lead in sculpting the state of the future. They must, however, be
sensitive to the need for the constitutional space to create and recreate the state in ways that further our evolving global
conscientiousness. It is ironic that at the edge of the twenty-first
century, the Court would opt for constitutional approaches that
unduly limit legislative flexibility.

VI. CONCLUSION

Parts II and III of this Article have argued that the processes
of globalization now prevalent throughout much of the world have
changed the state's structure and role fundamentally. These
changes necessitate more than a new rhetoric or legal language.
They require structural changes and a new legal architecture
appropriate for problems and actors that no longer identify with
any single territorial jurisdiction. Such fundamental changes
cannot occur overnight, especially given the fact that domestic
legal systems traditionally have been exclusively state-centered in
approach and outlook. Parts IV and V have thus developed
further and applied a global perspective to two fundamental
doctrines and issues in public law: the public/private distinction
and the doctrine of federalism.
Developing and applying a global perspective to these issues
is important for a number of reasons. First, such an approach
provides a critical perspective for assessing certain judicial
decisions and approaches to issues, as well as those of the
Congress and the Executive. These decisions increasingly utilize
the private sector to carry out various public policies and they
frequently devolve power to individual states. A global perspective
highlights how important it is for courts to determine where the
realities of markets begin and where market metaphors end. This
approach also highlights how important it is for courts to retain
and, at times, create the legal, interpretive space necessary to
provide for regulatory flexibility, and new power-sharing
arrangements.
Such flexibility is necessary if new regulatory
approaches are to deal with what once were domestic issues, but
are now inextricably intertwined with a global economy. A global
perspective thus contributes to the articulation of domestic law
approaches suitable for the global, realities in which states and
non-state actors must operate and, increasingly, share power. A
global perspective also helps us to understand that often much
more is involved in such regulatory reform proposals than simply
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a local political choice between a market or governmental
solution, or between a state-based or federal approach.
What increasingly emerges at the heart of domestic law
issues viewed in a global context are significant and important
issues of democracy. This Article does not try to answer or
resolve all of these issues, but in showing what is at stake in
seemingly narrow doctrinal decisions involving the public/private
distinction, this Article poses these issues as important questions
that today should be considered in a global context. Thus,
concepts of sovereignty and citizenship that once may have been
appropriate when state/federal distinctions had no global
significance, no longer can be viewed so simply. A balance must
be struck among the various levels of citizenship that now
converge in individuals and entities whose locale is only one
dimension of their more global operations.
Under these
circumstances, democratic processes can become stretched or
fragmented.
Democracy that becomes too fragmented may

ultimately undermine the ability of states to take collective action
at a national or an international level. Concepts of citizenship
and sovereignty, then, must be capable of the kind of flexibility
needed to simultaneously combine in various ways local, national,
and global identities insofar as these bear on democratic
participation.
Courts cannot create the legal structures and doctrines
necessary for this new era on their own. They can, however, be
appropriately deferential to lawmakers' attempts to create new
forms of regulation or to encourage new public/private
partnerships. These partnerships require the development of a
new sense of what is public and what is private and new
sensitivities to the limits of political representation and the need
for new forms of accountability. Courts and lawmakers generally
must begin to see deregulation and various rises of the market as
a delegation of power to the private sector, and they must seek to
develop new forms of democratic accountability to preserve a
public voice in these issues.
At the same time, courts can and should seek to prevent the
development of illegitimate global currency-that is, the kinds of
cost-savings that may enhance the global competitiveness of some
individuals, firms or states, but at the expense of certain
constitutional or statutory rights. Indeed, in such circumstances,
it is often the rights of the least well-represented segments of
society that are the most vulnerable, even when they are not
under outright attack. Thus, issues involving the contracting-out
of services, especially those such as prisons, should bear close
scrutiny by the courts, recognizing that words such as public,
private, market, citizen, and consumer, are but labels that require
contextual analysis and substance before they are meaningful.
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The legislative and executive branches of government
ultimately must take the lead in defining the role of the state in
response to the increasingly economically integrated world in
which we live and whose implications for democracy remain to be
worked out. This Article has put forth the concept of the
globalizing state to help understand and compare the significance
of the fundamentally different pressures felt by and the new roles
played by the state. Ultimately, it is our conception of what a
state is or can be that shapes the way we think of law, especially
those areas of the law that deal directly with the government,
such as constitutional and administrative law. As we begin to
develop new statutory and doctrinal approaches for the
globalizing state, we cannot return to any of the pasts we have
known. The globalizing state requires a global jurisprudence.
That jurisprudence must be sensitive to the emerging dynamics of
global integration as well as the ways these dynamics highlight
the range of democratic possibilities within and outside those
globalizing processes.

